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Investment-Environment Disputes: Challenges and Proposals
Mohamed F. Sweify*
INTRODUCTION
How effective is arbitration in resolving investment disputes, and
what are the prospects of this method when the dispute involves non-
investment issues, such as the environmental issues?  These questions
are likely to prompt diverse discussions and analysis of overlapping
bodies of law.  It is apparent that the system of investment arbitration
is a dynamic system that evolves over time to present distinct chal-
lenges to its players, including arbitrators, foreign investors, host
states, and third-party stakeholders.
Given the particular advantages globalization offers to international
trade across borders, there are influxes of international trade and in-
vestment, which spur the economic development of developing coun-
tries.  This globalization prompts states to transfer their sovereign
power in decision-making from the national into the international
level. Consequently, a massive number of international treaties in dif-
ferent fields have been concluded between states.1  Foreign Direct In-
vestment (“FDI”) constitutes a major stake in these treaties.  The
importance of FDI lies not only in the long-term source of develop-
ment that involves international capital flows, but also in the features
it brings to the developing countries, such as technologies, know-how,
and profit, without contributing to the country’s debt burden.
Yet, the attractiveness of the developing countries to the rapid flow
of international investment reflects lower environmental conditions in
those countries.2  Recently, the relationship between human activities
and harmful impact upon the environment became indisputable.3
Such relationship necessitates governmental interference to limit the
* Mohamed Sweify, District Attorney, Egypt; LL.M. in International Arbitration (Pep-
perdine University 2015); LL.M. in International Business Law (Indiana University 2013); LL.B.
Cairo University (2009).
1. Until 2008, there were around 2,500 treaties that have been entered into worldwide. See
Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the
Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775 (2008).
2. DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW AND POLICY at 1346 (2007).
3. See infra Part IV.
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environmentally harmful activities.  Consequently, International In-
vestment Agreements (“IIAs”) began to address environmental con-
cerns due to their importance.4  Such interaction between investment
laws and the heightened environmental standards reflects the poten-
tial impacts of the governmental measures enacted for environmental
protection upon the investment activities.5
Although the environmental measures may threaten the profitabil-
ity of the investment activities,6 investors cast little consideration to
the environmental issues.  Usually, investors worry about the potential
liability arising from past, present, and future environmental practices
and the uncertainty over future environmental standards. Such uncer-
tainties may adversely deprive the investors of the utility of the invest-
ment.  On the other hand, states may view foreign investments as a
restriction of their internal regulatory policy and powers to exercise
national sovereignty7 and may also be concerned about overwhelming
foreign investors with burdensome regulations.8
On another note, foreign investments are not only challenges,9 they
are opportunities for environmental protection and sustainable devel-
opment as well.10  Foreign investment might bring with it cutting-edge
environmental technologies that may help developing countries over-
ride the most damaging phases of their development.11  However,
states have legitimate fears regarding unsafe technologies that may
affect the environment and human health in general.12  Foreign invest-
4. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ENVIRONMENT, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/23, UN Sales No. E.01.II.D.3 (2001), at 2 (2001), http://unctad.org/en/
docs/psiteiitd 23.en.pdf; Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in Interna-
tional Investment Agreements: A Survey, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), Working papers on International Investment 2011/01 (2011), http://www.oecd
.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2011_1.pdf.
5. Vivian H.W. Wang, (Investor Protection or Environmental Protection? “Green” Develop-
ment Under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 281 (2007).
6. Environmental concerns, in some authors’ opinions, are considered one of the sources of
tension that may threaten international peace and security. Cesare P.R. Romano, International
Dispute Settlement in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1037
(Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
7. Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on a State’s Regula-
tory Autonomy Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 245 (2012).
8. Mary E. Footer, BITS and Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation of
Foreign Investment, MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 40 (2009).
9. Nadia B. Ahmad, A National Mineral Policy As an International Investment Law Stratagem:
The Case of Tajikistan’s Gold Reserves, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 5-6
(2014).
10. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1344.
11. Id. at 1345.
12. An example of environmental disaster that resulted from dangerous and inappropriate
technologies is the 1984 isocyanate gas leak in Bhopal, India, that killed several thousand people.
This was caused by foreign investment bringing in environmentally hazardous technologies with
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ments and strict environmental regulations together are an indispen-
sable vehicle for Environmentally Sound Technology (“EST”) transfer
which is paramount for the goal of sustainable development.  Moreo-
ver, what is at stake is not the trade-off of “high investment-low envi-
ronment,” but ”continued investment-regulatory change.”13
There is a need to stabilize the investment framework conditions,
procedurally and substantively,14 and upgrade the standards of envi-
ronmental protection. Furthermore, foreign investment correlates
with the principles of human rights, which refers to environmental
protection as one of its main goals.  The principles of human rights are
increasingly being raised in investment treaty lawsuits by host states,
investors, third-parties, or judges.15  Both investors and states might
violate human rights principles and both of them may invoke these
principles in the application or interpretation of investment treaty
obligations.16
This paper focuses on the potential tension between the investor’s
rights and the host state’s capacity to regulate its environmental con-
cerns through enacting legislations to protect the environment without
being obliged to compensate the investor for reducing their property
values.  In certain situations, host states should compensate the inves-
tor for the taking of property.  The fundamental challenge is to strike
a balance between the stability concerns that should surround the in-
vestment activities and the need to strengthen environmental
regulations.17
The reflections that make up this paper are organized under topical
headings corresponding to the areas of significant concern.  Part I “In-
ternational Environmental Law” explores the environmental con-
cepts, points out various environmental instruments, identifies
neither an environmental law framework nor technical infrastructure to tackle the resulting envi-
ronmental problems. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1343.
13. Gaetan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic Environ-
mental Policies: Striking A “Reasonable” Balance Between Stability and Change, 29 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 451, 457-58 (1998).
14. In the context of international trade, the environmental disputes became frequent topics
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), starting with the Tuna-Dolphin
cases and the environmental damage caused by the 1991 Gulf War generated an unprecedented
volume of state responsibility claims that were settled by the UN Security Council’s Compensa-
tion Commission (UNCC). See Peter H. Sand, The Evolution of International Environmental
Law in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 36 (Daniel Bodan-
sky et al. eds., 2007).
15. N. Jansen Calamita, David Earnest & Markus Burgstaller, The Future of ICSID and the
Place of Investment Treaties in International law: Investment Treaty Law Current Issues IV, BRIT.
INST. INT’L & COMP. L. 25 (2013).
16. Id. at 29.
17. Verhoosel, supra note 13, at 453-54.
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environmental principles that correlate with investment concepts, and
finally examines human rights principles and its relationship with both
investment and environment.  Part II “International Investment Law”
discusses extensively the different concepts and principles governing
foreign investments and the environmental issues associated with in-
vestment.  Part III “Interaction between Investment and Environ-
ment” deals with the issues relating to the tension between both
bodies of law in theory and in practice.  Part IV “Concerns about of
Investment-Environment Disputes” discusses a number of concerns
that might arise in the investment disputes that involve environmental
issues, analyzes the approaches adopted by different tribunals that
dealt with such disputes, and points out the lack of transparency in
these disputes.  Part V “Proposed Regimes” briefly considers the im-
portant implications of key development in investment arbitration and
proposes some new mechanisms procedurally and substantively that
may, in the author’s view, assist in balancing the conflicting interests
and address the tension between both bodies of law.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
International environmental law is neither a separate nor self-con-
tained system but it is part of international law as a whole.18  There is
a lack of coherence in the international environmental system due to
the absence of a dedicated international environmental organization
and an agreed international dispute settlement process.19  There are
no international bodies dedicated solely to addressing environmental
disputes.20
Evolution of Environmental Law and Regulation
In addition to the environmental principles that were escalated to
the level of customary international law, a growing number of interna-
tional environmental treaties have formed a body of international law
on environmental protection.21  Furthermore, international judicial
bodies, such as the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), have started
to pay more attention to environmental concerns.22  A database on
18. Alan Boyle, Relationship between International Environmental Law and Other Branches
of International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
126-27 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
19. Id.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. Lorenzo Cotula, Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development,
OECD at 10 (2008), http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311122.pdf.
22. Id.
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“binding” international environmental agreements contains, as of
2010, over 2,700 relevant treaties, of which 1,538 were bilateral trea-
ties, 1,039 multilateral treaties, and 159 other agreements.  Over 2,300
of these treaties were adopted after 1950 and the rate of adoption
accelerated significantly during the 1990s.23
There are a number of international legal instruments concerning
the environment, including the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal24
and the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (or Stockholm Declaration).25  However, the most im-
portant international environmental instruments are the Rio Declara-
tion and the Stockholm Declaration.
The 1992 Rio Declaration
The leading remarkable environmental instrument on the interna-
tional sphere is the 1992 Rio Declaration.26  It articulates the agreed-
upon international environmental principles as of 1992.27  It concerns
working towards international agreements which respect the interests
of all states and protect the integrity of the global environmental and
developmental system.28
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration
The second leading environmental instrument is the 1972 Stock-
holm Declaration.  It sets forth the basic concepts and principles of
environment, such as the importance of reducing pollution as well as
integrating environment and development.  One of the implicit fea-
tures of this declaration is that Principle 21 strikes a balance between
a state’s sovereignty and its obligation not to cause harm to the envi-
ronment of another state or of the global commons.29
States, in signing these declarations, expressed the importance of
international cooperation in protecting the global environment.30  In-
23. Harnessing Freedom of Investment for Green Growth, OECD, at 49 (2010), http://www
.oecd.org/in vestment/internationalinvestmentagreements/46905672.pdf.
24. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionT
ext-e.pdf.
25. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972), http://
www.unep.org/ Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503.
26. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), http://www.unep.org/ Docu-
ments.Multilingual/ Default.Print.asp?documentid=78&articleid=%201163.
27. HUNTER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 466.
28. Rio Declaration, supra note 26.
29. HUNTER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 464-65.
30. China has incorporated numerous Rio Declaration principles into domestic Chinese law.
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corporating environmental concerns in foreign investments activities
is consistent with international environmental commitments by Multi-
National Enterprises (“MNEs”) as well as developed and developing
nations alike.31
Principles of Environmental Protection
Generally, human activities cause serious environmental
problems.32  Environmental protection addresses, among other issues,
the sustainable use of natural resources as well as   human, animal,
and plant health.33  For example, MNEs often invest in developing
countries where they can make profits without compliance to strict
regulatory standards that are applied in their home states.34
The term “environment” is, in itself, neutral.  Texts that talk about
the right to environment add a qualifying term to the word “environ-
ment.”  International instruments,35 and constitutional instruments36
qualify the term “environment” by adding a standard to it.37  The pol-
icy adopted by international environmental law emphasizes the pre-
vention and minimization of environmental damage, rather than
compensating the damage incurred.38
The assemblage of human rights law, environmental law, and inter-
national cultural law has developed a number of erga omnes obliga-
tions that are directed towards the international community as a
whole rather than to a specific state on a reciprocal basis, among
which is the duty to cooperate in preserving the environment.39  For
instance, members of the international community are required to
“take all necessary steps to minimize environmental damage,” “to
take all appropriate measures in accordance with good petroleum in-
31. Benjamin Martin, An Environmental Remedy to Paralyzed Negotiations for a Multilateral
Foreign Direct Investment Agreement, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 263-64 (2007); Jor-
dan C. Kahn, A Golden Opportunity for NAFTA, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 380, 387-88 (2008).
32. HUNTER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 15.
33. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 6.
34. M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 225 (2010).
35. The Stockholm Declaration mentions the phrase ”environment of a quality that permits a
life of dignity and well-being.”  Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25.
36. See Angel Manuel Moreno, The Right to Environmental Protection in the Spanish Consti-
tutional System, Avosetta Group (citing that the Spanish Constitution of 1978 provides for “the
right to enjoy an adequate environment for the development of the person”), available at http://
www-user.uni-bremen.de/avosetta/ morconstright.html.
37. Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28
STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 134-35 (1991).
38. Cotula, supra note 21, at 10.
39. Valentina S. Vadi, When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, Natural Resources,
and Indigenous Heritage In International Investment Law, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 797,
816-17 (2011).
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dustry practice,” “to take all reasonable precautions against pollu-
tion,” or to ensure that operations are “conducted in a workmanlike
manner with reasonable precautions.”40
A key tenet of environmental protection is that those who are re-
sponsible for harming the environment should bear the cost of pro-
tecting it.41  Accordingly, investors would eliminate the damaging
activities to those aimed at meeting the necessities. This is the so-
called “internalizing externalities.”42  Internalizing environmental
costs shifts the cost of environmental harm from society as a whole to
the person who causes the harm.43  It would be more economically
efficient to establish prescriptive regulations mandating what parties
can and cannot do.44
Environmental protection could be achieved through the IIAs or
the mandatory regulations that apply statutes and rules of conduct.45
More significant might be the integration of green economy objectives
into IIAs and the screening of investments based strictly on environ-
mental criteria that would help in refining a government’s environ-
mentally sustainable objectives.46  In this way, MNEs and Non-
Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) may contribute significantly
to the preservation of the environment.  The environmental responsi-
bility of MNEs goes beyond compliance with such standards to the
development and maintenance of best practices on environmental res-
toration, conservation, risk and impact assessment and cooperation
with national authorities.47
Thus, a set of principles have been developed under the interna-
tional environmental law to guide states’ behavior regarding sus-
tainability.  These principles help in reconciling the highly divergent
interests in the area of public policy that demands flexibility, adapta-
40. Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: In-
ternational Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 215, n.58 (1996).
41. J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection,
29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 466 (1999).
42. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 126-27.
43. This is the principle of “polluter pays.” Wagner, supra note 41, at 470.
44. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 129. These regulations range from very prescriptive
“command-and-control” regulations that require specific technology, to specific processes re-
quirements, to more flexible mechanisms that set emissions limits but allow the firm the flexibil-
ity to decide how to achieve them most efficiently.
45. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 7.
46. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Board, External evaluation of UNCTAD sub-
programme 2: Investment and enterprise, U.N. Doc. TD/B/WP(68)/CRP.2, at 20 (2014) http://
unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocum ents/wpd264_en.pdf.
47. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 21.
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bility, and pluralism.48  Our main focus will be directed to a number of
these principles due to their impact upon investment disciplines,
namely, sustainable development, the precautionary principle, the
polluter-pays principle, the principle of non-causing environmental
harm, and the principle of prevention.
Sustainable Development
Pursuant to principles 12 of the Rio Declaration49 and principle 13
of the 1972 Stockholm declaration,50 states should cooperate to pro-
mote the international economic system in order to increase the eco-
nomic growth and sustainable development to better address
environmental degradation. Sustainable development can be defined
as “development that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”51
 Furthermore, it may be defined as “the composition, structure, and
distribution of ecosystems that affect the ways in which energy and
materials are exchanged.”52  It links environmental, technological, and
social concerns with the economic decision-making process.53  The
Rio Declaration recognizes the supremacy of development54 and
holds states liable for the well-being of citizens and for harm caused to
the environment.
The Precautionary Principle
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that “[i]n order to protect
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied
by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.”55  This principle is an integral part of in-
ternational law.  The rationality of this principle is based on the fact
that “science does not always provide all relevant information to take
protective steps against environmental harm, and that potentially haz-
ardous effects may occur if humanity waits for science to provide the
48. Marcos A. Orellana, Science, Risk and Uncertainty, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 713-14 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas W. Walde eds., 2007).
49. Rio Declaration, supra note 26.
50. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25.
51. Ahmad, supra note 9, at 5-6.
52. Mukul Sanwal, Sustainable Development, the Rio Declaration and Multilateral Coopera-
tion, 4 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 45, 48 (1993).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Rio Declaration, supra note 26.
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required insights.”56  In this way, the precautionary principle under-
scores the need for authorities to protect the environment from poten-
tial risks, even if the degree of environmental danger is unknown.57
The Polluter-Pays Principle
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration indicates that the person who is
responsible for pollution - the polluter - should bear the expenses de-
cided by the public authorities to restore the sound state of the envi-
ronment.58  It allocates the costs of pollution prevention and control
measures to ensure the sound use of environmental resources and
avoid destroying foreign investment.
The Principle of Non-Causing Environmental Harm
Internationally, each state has a general obligation to protect the
environment and promote sustainable development.  This obligation
is reflected in various international instruments as a “principle of com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities.”59  The central principle is the
obligation of states not to cause environmental harm, which is gener-
ally considered part of customary international law.60
The Principle of Prevention
There is interrelation between the prevention principle and the ob-
ligation not to cause environmental harm.  Nevertheless, when the in-
volving parties are states, they will often be the same.61  The
prevention principle requires states to anticipate environmental dam-
age and to act prospectively to prevent it.62  Protection of environ-
ment is best achieved when states act as preventers of harm more than
56. Martin, supra note 31, at 261-62.
57. Id.
58. Rio Declaration, supra note 26; see also OECD, Environment Policy Committee, Guiding
Principles Concerning the International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, Doc. No.
C(72)128, 1972 WL 24710.
59. HUNTER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 495.
60. Id. at 502-03. This obligation has its roots in the common law principle of sic utere ut
alienum non laedus (i.e., do not use your property to harm another). Additionally, states are
obliged not to use their territory directly or indirectly in a way that harm another state’s inter-
ests, which was extended to environmental damage since 1941 in the well-known Trail Smelter
arbitration. Id.
61. The prevention principle was embodied in Article 3 of the ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles on
the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, which states that states shall
“take all necessary measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to mini-
mize the risk thereof.”
62. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 507.
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as remedial bodies after the occurrence of harm.  This is most cost-
efficient.
Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”)
States can anticipate the environmental harm by undertaking an
Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”),63 which can be defined
as a “process for assessing the impact of proposed activities, policies
or programs to integrate environmental issues into development plan-
ning.”64  The governmental authorities, under this test, have to iden-
tify the environmental effects of the proposed activities on its territory
and its citizens.65  For instance, since 1989 the World Bank has re-
quired an EIA before approving the finance of any project financ-
ing.66  The EIA serves two purposes:  on the one hand, it is an
appropriate method of forcing the preservation of the environment
and, on the other hand, it is a tool that helps to avoid future disputes.
This practice shows the willingness of FDI players to pay greater at-
tention to environmental concerns in host countries.67
Rapidly, the EIA technique, which originated in section 102(c) of
the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act, spread to more than 80
countries worldwide and was incorporated into a 1985 Council Direc-
tive of the European Union and the 1991 UNECE Convention on En-
vironmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context.68  This
development reflects the success of adopting such technique and in-
troducing it to environmental disputes became a necessity.
Evolution of Human Rights Law
Human rights principles occupy an important position on the inter-
national arena. One of the fundamental goals of human rights is to
63. See infra Part V “Proposed Regimes.”
64. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 531.
65. Id.
66. Several projects have been modified as a result of an EIA.  For example, the developers of
the Botswana Tuli Blocks Roads project had to reroute a road in order to preserve an archeo-
logical site. See Vadi, supra note 39, at 874-75; Martin, supra note 31, at 253-54.
67. The rationale of the EIA was questioned by the Maffezini tribunal which affirmed that
“the environmental impact assessment procedure is basic for adequate protection of the environ-
ment and the application of appropriate environmental measures.  This is true not only under
Spanish and [European Economic Community] Law, but also increasingly so under international
law.”  To conclude, the Tribunal held Spain not liable because it had simply required compliance
with its environmental laws in a manner consistent with its investment treaty commitments.  This
award was rendered in the Spanish language, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC566_Sp&caseId=C163.
The English parts of this award were referred to in Valentina S. Vadi, supra note 39, at 875.
68. Sand, supra note 14, at 37.
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achieve justice and peace.  In achieving these ends, there should be a
legal recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family.69  Besides, one of the main goals of the human
rights principles is to protect the environment, which simultaneously
enhances the protection of human life.
Human rights and environmental protection represent different but
overlapping social values.  Although violation of environmental prin-
ciples might be a violation of human rights principles and vice versa,
this is not always the case.  Environmental issues might also be ad-
dressed outside the framework of human rights.70
Environmental protection may be addressed through human rights
principles by one of the following alternatives.  The first approach is
to assert that human rights relate to the environment, such as the
rights to life, personal security, health, and food.  A safe environment
could be a pre-condition to those rights because unsound environment
affects adversely the enjoyment of these rights. A second approach
would be to recognize a specific “right to environment” to the current
array of human rights.71  Additionally, the debate concerns the goals
of environmental protection itself - whether to enhance human well-
being or whether it has broader goals that subordinate short-term
human needs to the overall protection of nature.72  Starting with the
Stockholm Declaration, the right to environment became part of sev-
eral international and regional human rights instruments.73  In addi-
tion, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities of the Economic and Social Council Commis-
sion on Human Rights adopted a resolution that referred to the right
of all peoples to life and the right of future generations to enjoy their
environmental heritage.74
69. Shelton, supra note 37, at 106-07.
70. Id. at 105.
71. Those alternatives are discussed in Shelton, supra note 37, at 105.
72. Id. at 107.
73. Id. at 125.  For example, the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) drafted the Charter on Environ-
mental Rights and Obligations, which affirms the fundamental principle that everyone has the
right to an environment adequate for general health and well-being.  The Charter formulates this
right primarily by developing the procedural rights of access to information, due process, and
participation in decision-making, http://www.unece.org/leginstr/ env.html.
74. Resolution 1988/26 considered the specific question of the movement of toxic and danger-
ous products and wastes concerning human rights and scientific and technological developments.
See Dinah Shelton, supra note 37, at 129.
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INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
The law of foreign investments is one of the most significant areas
of international law75 due to the protection it offers to foreign proper-
ties in the host states in which the investment is made. It has enjoyed
rapid growth in the last decades76 due to the tremendous tools that
were enacted to regulate investment law.77  Furthermore, it includes
not only treaties but also investment contracts between foreign inves-
tors and host states (“State Contracts”).  However, the misconduct of
MNEs reflects a stark imbalance between the extreme protection
often accorded to foreign investors and the lesser protection given to
the environment of the host states.78
Although foreign investors view developing countries as sources for
financial profits, they have concerns about their investments in the
host states where they would be subject to the state’s lawmaking au-
thority.79  In order to attract FDI,80 states usually offer certain forms
of protection guarantees, whether substantial or procedural, to foreign
investors, which find their sources in national laws, Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties (BITs), Multilateral Investment Treaties (“MITs”), and
State Contracts.
75. Vadi, supra note 39, at 822.
76. Surya P. Subedi, The Challenge of Reconciling the Competing Principles within the Law of
Foreign Investment with Special Reference to the Recent Trend in the Interpretation of the Term
“Expropriation,” 40 INT’L LAW. 121, 122 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1895709.
77. These tools include the International Investment Agreements (“IIAs”), which include Bi-
lateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”), Multilateral Investment Treaties (“MITs”), and Regional
Investment Treaties.  BIT refers to the international treaty that regulates the issues of invest-
ment between two state parties only, whereas the MIT functions the same as BIT but between
more than two state parties.  The number of IIAs has increased steadily from 1959 until 1990
after which the rate jumped.  At 1990, the number of BITs in force was 400, leaped to 1,000 in
1995, and reached 1,800 in 2000. See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, U.N.
Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2  (2000), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf.  In 2013, 44
IIAs were concluded, including 30 BITs and 14 other economic cooperation agreements with
investment-related provisions.  Accordingly, the total number of IIAs reached 3,236 in 2013.  In
the meantime, several BITs were also terminated in 2013.  For example, South Africa gave no-
tice of the termination of its BITs with Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland; Indo-
nesia gave notice of the termination of its BIT with the Netherlands in 2014. See UNCTAD
Reports 2014, available at http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/diae_stat_2014-06-24_WIR14_
en.pdf.
78. Kate Miles, International Investment Law: Origins, Imperialism and Conceptualizing The
Environment, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 25-26 (2010).
79. Choudhury, supra note 1, at 779-80.
80. A direct investment enterprise is an enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10%, less,
or more of the ordinary shares. See http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-corpora-
tions-(TNC).aspx.
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Historically, FDI was mainly focused in extractive industries in poor
developing countries.81  Nevertheless, FDI has grown over the past
forty years to include other kinds of investment.82  More than 3000
investment treaties were developed in order to provide extensive pro-
tection to investors and foster economic development.83  A quick
glimpse over the national investment policymaking in 2013 reveals
that governments are more liberal than the past towards promoting
foreign investments.84
States grant foreign investors various kinds of guarantees to facili-
tate and protect the regulatory framework of their investment.  Due
to the importance of the principles governing the investment disputes,
our discussion will consider these principles, including national treat-
ment, most-favored nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment,
stabilization clauses, and protection from expropriation.  A detailed
discussion will be devoted to the principle of expropriation and its
distinction from regulatory measures.
National Treatment
National treatment can be defined as “a principle whereby a host
country extends to foreign investors treatment that is at least as
favorable as the treatment that it accords to national investors in like
circumstances.”85  It is a guarantee to foreign investors to enjoy the
competitive equality with national investors of the host state.  To
amount to a violation of the national treatment principle, the regula-
tory measure has to be discriminatory, that is, to favor national inves-
tors over foreign investors.86  Arbitral tribunals interpret this principle
broadly regardless of the words used to describe it.87  Claimants ad-
81. See http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/diae_stat_2014-06-24_WIR14_en.pdf.
82. The investment of developing and transition economies was $553 billion, or 39%, of global
FDI outflows, compared to 12% only in the early 2000s. See UNCTAD-Global Investment
Trends Monitor 2014, at 1, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2014d1_en.pdf.
83. Vadi, supra note 39, at 822.
84. The overall share of regulatory or restrictive investment policies increased from 25% in
2012 to 27% in 2013. See UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014, available at http://unctad
.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/ diae_stat_2014-06-24_WIR14_en.pdf.
85. UNCTAD, NATIONAL TREATMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.16 (1999), http://unctad. org/
en/docs/ psiteiitd11v4.en.pdf.
86. Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 9 International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID)Reports 66, para. 220 (2001), available at http://www.italaw.com/
documents/Lauder Award.pdf.
87. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 180 (2008).
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vanced national treatment claims in ten decided cases and were up-
held in four cases under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.88
Nevertheless, the legal requirement for breaching this standard is
unclear as to whether the discriminatory measure requires only a less
favorable treatment to the foreign investor or whether the foreign na-
tionality has to be the basis for such discrimination.89  Some tribunals
find less favorable treatment is sufficient to uphold a breach of this
standard.90  However, the measure should be geared directly towards
the foreign investor to be discriminatory.91  Therefore, the foreign na-
tionality should be the basic motivation for issuing the discriminatory
measure that favors nationals over non-nationals.
Furthermore, tribunals differ in their requirements of intent as an
element of discriminatory measures.  While some tribunals seem to
focus on the practical impact of the discriminatory measure,92 others
require the clear intent to discriminate against foreign investors to
constitute a breach of this principle.93  However, the intent is not nec-
essary as long as the measure results in discriminatory treatment be-
cause intent is too difficult to prove.
Most-Favored Nation Treatment
Most-favored nation treatment (“MFN”) is always associated with
the national treatment principle, mostly in a single provision.94  MFN
obliges the host state not to treat one foreigner’s investment less fa-
vorably than that of an investor from another foreign country.95  It
requires a “comparison between the treatment afforded to two foreign
88. LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION at 83
(2010).
89. David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regula-
tion Under Nafta’s Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 651, 677 (2001).
90. International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, Arbitral Award, para. 177 (2006),
http://www. italaw.com/documents/ThunderbirdAward.pdf.
91. GAMI v. Mexico, Final Award, para. 114-15, where the Tribunal found “the solvency of an
important local industry to be a legitimate policy goal and underlined that the relevant measures
were not geared towards foreign investor” (2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organizat ion/
38789.pdf.
92. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award, para. 254 (2000), http://www.italaw.com/
documents/SDMeyers-1stPartialAward.pdf.  In Siemens v. Argentina, Award, para. 321, the Tri-
bunal states that “[t]he Tribunal concurs that intent is not decisive or essential for a finding of
discrimination, and that the impact of the measure on the investment would be the determining
factor” (2007), http://www.italaw.com/documents/ Siemens-Argentina-Award.pdf.
93. Genin v Estonia, Award, (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2), 17 ICSID Review-FILJ (2002) 395,
para. 369 (2001), http://www.italaw.com/documents/Genin-Award.pdf.
94. For Example, Article 2(1) of the US-Argentina BIT and Article 7 of the Model UK BIT.
95. REED ET AL., supra note 88, at 82.
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investors in like circumstances.”96  This principle acts as an additional
guarantee of equality and non-discrimination.97  Although this princi-
ple concerns primarily substantive rights, such as fair and equitable
treatment98 and the standard of compensation in expropriation
cases,99 some tribunals have used it to overcome jurisdictional and
procedural issues by borrowing procedural provisions from other
BITs, especially the provision of a dispute settlement mechanism.100
However, other tribunals are reluctant to extend the MFN clause to
procedural rights.101  Nevertheless, tribunals should be cautious in in-
voking the MFN clause to benefit from provisions of third treaties
(that are not related to the parties of the dispute) and should limit
such practice to comparable treaties pursuant to the subject matter,
such as investment treaties.  Otherwise, the ‘like-circumstances’ or
‘like-situations’ case would be difficult to prove.
Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”)
BITs typically call for “fair and equitable treatment” to be afforded
to foreign nationals, but do not define the term.  Rather, they leave
room for the tribunals to reviewing the “fairness” and “equity” of the
96. UNCTAD, MOST-FAVOURED NATION TREATMENT (2010), http://unctad.org/en/docs/
diaeia20101_en.pdf.
97. Id. at 1.
98. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29) (2001). available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? re-
questType=Cases RH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC523_En&caseId=C27.The Tribunal re-
ferred to the general possibility to “import” a fair and equitable treatment provision contained
in another BIT that was cited in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada (2001).
99. The Tribunal in CME held that “[t]he determination of compensation under the Treaty
between the Netherlands and the Czech Republic on basis of the ‘fair market value’ finds further
support in ‘the most favored nation’ provision of Art. 3(5) of the Treaty.”  CME Czech Republic
B.V. v. Czech Republic, Final Award, para. 500, at 116 (2003), http://italaw.com/documents/
CME-2003-Final_001.pdf.
100. REED ET AL., supra note 88, at 85.  The first ICSID case that adopted this approach is
Emilio Agustı´n Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7) (2000).  This award
is published in the Spanish language and the relevant parts were translated as follows “[A]n
Argentina investor filed an ICSID claim against Spain, although he had not previously submitted
the dispute to the Spanish courts as required by the Argentina-Spain BIT.  He argued, however,
that he could by-pass this precondition to ICSID arbitration by invoking the MFN clause of the
Argentina-Spain BIT to claim an equally favorable benefit under Spain’s BIT with Chile, which
does not require investors to seek prior recourse in local courts.  The ICSID tribunal agreed,
holding that, on the basis of the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain treaty, the Argentina inves-
tor could rely on the less stringent procedural provisions of the Chile-Spain BIT.” Id.
101. Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24),
para.146-51 (2005), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&ac
tionVal=showDoc&docId=DC521_En&caseId=C24; Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Re-
public of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15), Award, para. 56 92006), https://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC652_En
&caseId=C240.
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actions of the host state in light of all the circumstances of each
case.102  FET is a difficult standard to define in precise legal terms.  It
functions as a gap-filler for other standards.103  However, it is distinc-
tive from other standards; there might be an FET violation without
violating other standards.
Furthermore, FET arguably provides protection beyond the mini-
mum standards provided by customary international law.104  The Free
Trade Commission (“FTC”) of NAFTA105 interpreted “FET” as re-
quiring the same treatment that is required by the  minimum standard
of treatment for aliens under customary international law.106  NAFTA
tribunals adopted the same approach as the FTC107 and many subse-
quent BITs followed the FTC approach.108  In applying the FET, the
tribunals identified typical factual situations to which the principle
should apply, such as transparency,109 investor’s legitimate expecta-
tions, compliance with contractual obligations,110 due process and pro-
cedural fairness,111 and good faith.112
Stabilization Clauses
Stabilization clauses became a permanent feature of BITs and na-
tional investment laws.  Stabilization clauses provide that any future
102. REED ET AL., supra note 88, at 74.
103. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 87, at 122.
104. See generally id. at 124-25.
105. For more details about NAFTA, see infra Part III(C)(1).
106. NAFTA, Article 1104: Standard of Treatment, http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/ Commi-
sion/CH11 understanding_e.asp.
107. Pope & Talbot, supra note 98, para. 17-69 (2001); Methanex Corp. v. USA, Final Award,
para. 17-24 (2005).
108. These include Chile-United States FTA Article 10.4 (2003); United States-Uruguay BIT
Article 5 (2004); and Canada Model BIT Article 5.
109. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 87, at 133-34; see also infra Part IV(B).
110. It is closely related to investor’s legitimate expectation.  Applying the Pacta sunt ser-
vanda enhances the stability requirements of the FET standard.  A number of tribunals decided
that violating contractual arrangements violates the legitimate expectation of the investor, but
the question remains whether any contractual violation amounts to FET violation.  Tribunals
vary in their approaches.  Some of them take a more restrictive approach beyond a simple
breach, such as Consortium RFCC v Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/000/6) (a French award)
(only measures taken by Morocco in its sovereign capacity are capable of breaching FET; ordi-
nary violations do not rise to violating FET), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front Ser-
vlet?requestType= CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC613_Fr&caseId=C193.Other
tribunals consider any contractual violation a FET violation, such as Mondev International Ltd.
v. United States of America (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2), Award (2002).
111. See infra Part IV(B).
112. The tribunals that upheld the FET violations based their decisions on a combination of
these elements of FET, namely, transparency, legitimate expectation, contractual obligations, or
due process.  In addition, there are no reported cases that upheld the environmental damage as
conduct to be weighed against an alleged breach of the FET standard.
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changes in the host state’s law that may result in disadvantages to for-
eign investors will not be applied to them.113  They are incorporated
basically by investors in the state contracts to promote the regulatory
investment stability during the long-term life period of the investment
against any form of taking.
Stabilization clauses may be classified into three categories: a)
freezing clauses which “freeze” the laws of the host state with respect
to the investment project during the project life;114 b) economic equi-
librium clauses, which require the investor to comply with new laws
with compensation for the cost of complying with those laws, but ex-
emptions from complying with the new laws are not specifically men-
tioned in the contract;115 and c) hybrid clauses, which require the state
to restore the investor to the same position it had prior to changing
the law, including, as stated in the contract, exemptions from new
laws.116
Basically, stabilization clauses oblige the host states not to change
the regulatory framework in a way that affects the economic equilib-
rium of the project; otherwise, it should compensate the investor.117
From an environmental perspective, these clauses could result in un-
developed countries remaining undeveloped because they already lag
behind in their laws and will not be able to upgrade them to meet
international standards.118  In addition, excluding the ongoing invest-
ments or prospective investments from the regulatory legal frame-
work of the host state may affect the coherence of the overall legal
framework because similar investment projects may be governed by
different rules.119
Besides, stabilization clauses may put the host state in a position of
dealing with unknown future environmental hazards without having
the appropriate means of combatting them.120  States may issue envi-
113. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 87, at 75.
114. Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights: A research project conducted for IFC and the
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human
Rights, at vii (2009), http://www.ifc. org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515bb18/
Stabilizat ion%2BPaper.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
115. Id.
116. Id. “Forty-four of the 75 (about 59%) contracts and models in the study from non-OECD
countries give exemptions or offer an opportunity for compensation for compliance with all new
laws, including environmental and social laws.  None of the OECD country contracts or models
in the study offer exemptions from new laws, while only two of 13 (about 15 percent) of con-
tracts and models from the OECD offer an opportunity to claim compensation for compliance
with all new laws, including environmental and social laws.” Id. at ix.
117. Cotula, supra note 21, at 2.
118. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1352-53.
119. Cotula, supra note 21, at 11.
120. Id.
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ronmental regulations or impose environmental fiscal instruments,
such as levies or charges to protect its environment from such hazards
and to adapt to the changing environmental conditions or its interna-
tional law obligations to comply with evolving international environ-
mental laws.121  This would contradict its obligation under the
contractual stabilization clause (pacta sunt servanda).
New environmental obligations may be developed or changed in
different ways.  New techniques of environmental assessment may be
introduced under existing laws, new interpretations of environmental
law, or completely new or amended environmental legislations.122
Such unforeseen changes in content, scope, and impact may be in-
duced by the emergence of new technologies or international stan-
dards, the reasonable dealing with the damages caused by the project,
or political influence from environmental organizations.123  Stabiliza-
tion clauses may, arguably, trigger the state’s obligations towards the
investor to pay full restitution or require compensation for breach of
the agreement.124
Expropriation
The importance of expropriation emanates from its impact upon the
investment property.  It deprives the investor of the possession of the
investment property, physically or economically.  First, I will define
expropriation and discuss its elements.  Then, I will explain the differ-
ence between direct and indirect expropriation.  I will also discuss the
difference between the regulatory measures and the expropriatory
measures.
Definition of Expropriation
Expropriation generally refers to “property-specific or enterprise-
specific takings where the property rights remain with the state or are
transferred by the state to other economic operators.”125  Expropria-
tion may be defined as the state’s sovereign right to control all the
property by any means, including “taking” or destruction, within its
territory whether owned by nationals or aliens.126
121. Id. at 12.
122. Waelde & Ndi, supra note 40, 230-31.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 243-44.
125. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, at 5-6 (2012), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011
d7_en.pdf.
126. The problem with expropriation is not that straightforward as states do not usually inter-
fere through this direct formal expropriation, but they interfere without the formal taking of
property.
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From an investor’s perspective, expropriation is the most extreme
form of interference by the host state with the foreign investment.
From the host state’s perspective, it is a fundamental right that indi-
cates natural application of its territorial sovereignty over any prop-
erty located in its territory, including alien property.  The right of
compensation for expropriation finds its basis in customary interna-
tional law.  Virtually, all the BITs to date contain an expropriation
provision.127
In order for the expropriation to be lawful, a number of conditions
have to be met: (a) property has to be taken for a public purpose; (b)
on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of
law; (d) accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensa-
tion.128  Absent one of these conditions, the expropriation will be
unlawful.
Direct versus Indirect Expropriation
Expropriation may be direct or indirect.  Direct expropriation
means “a mandatory legal transfer of the title to the property or its
outright physical seizure.”129  It involves an intentional formal transfer
of title through enacting legislations or physical act of taking over the
investment from the investor.  On the other hand, indirect expropria-
tion, sometimes called “creeping,” “disguised,” “constructive,” “con-
sequential,” “regulatory,” or “virtual” expropriation,130 refers to the
state’s interference in the use or enjoyment of the investment to de-
prive the investor from the benefits of the property, though the legal
title of the property remains with the investor.131  While all IIAs refer
explicitly to direct expropriation, some of them do not refer explicitly
to indirect expropriation.132  Sometimes, they refer to indirect expro-
priation using phrases such as “having effect equivalent to . . . expro-
priation,” “any direct or indirect measure” of expropriation, “any
127. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 5; David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environ-
mental Protection and Investor Rights Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 ELR 10646, 10662
(2001).
128. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 1; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 87,
at 91.
129. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 6.
130. H. Hamner Hill, NAFTA and Environmental Protection: The First 10 years, J. INST. JUST.
INT’L STUD. 157, 158 (2006); UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 11.
131. Choudhury, supra note 1, at 792; Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You:
Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the Environment in Developing Countries, 6
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., no. 4, 2006, at 1, 8, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1740085;
UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 11.
132. The Lebanon-Malaysia (BIT) (2002), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1887.
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other measure having the same nature or the same effect against in-
vestments,” or “all other measures whose effect is to dispossess, di-
rectly or indirectly, the investors.”133  However, absence an explicit
reference, expropriation is defined broadly enough to cover both di-
rect and indirect taking.134
Indirect expropriations should have the following cumulative ele-
ments: (a) an act attributable to the state; (b) interference with prop-
erty rights or other protected legal interests; (c) of such degree that
the relevant rights or interests lose all or most of their value or the
owner is deprived of control over the investment; (d) even though the
owner retains the legal title or remains in physical possession.135  Pre-
dictably, what constitute indirect expropriation is difficult to deter-
mine and arbitral tribunals interpret it on a case-by-case basis.136
However, an indirect expropriation should have an equivalent effect
to a direct expropriation, that is, to render the property rights useless
and deprive the owner of the economic use of the investment.137
Indirect expropriation might be de facto or de jure expropriation.
In Te´cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican
States138 where the Claimant, Tecmed, was awarded a tender for the
sale of real property, buildings, and facilities, and other assets relating
to “Cytrar,” a landfill of hazardous industrial waste,139 which had a
renewable license to operate for a five-year term. In 1994, the license
became operable for an indefinite period of time.140  The landfill then
became the property of the government141 and the license terms were
amended to be for only one year subject to renewal.142  In 1998, the
government refused to renew the license.143  The Claimant initiated an
expropriation claim against Mexico.144
The Tribunal, in determining the expropriatory measure, considered
whether such a measure was proportional to the public interest pre-
133. Wagner, supra note 41, at 472-73.
134. Article 1110 of NAFTA. Environmentalists believe that environmental regulations may
be successfully challenged as indirect expropriations. See Hill, supra note 130, at 158.
135. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 12.
136. Gantz, supra note 127, at 10662.
137. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 63.
138. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, (ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)/00/2), Award (2003), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/
ita085 4.pdf.
139. Id. para. 35.
140. Id. para. 36.
141. Id. para. 37.
142. Id. para. 38.
143. Id. para. 39.
144. Tecmed decision, supra note 138, para. 93.
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sumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to
investments145 without considering the motivation for issuing the leg-
islation that failed to renew the permit for a landfill site due to envi-
ronmental concerns.146
The Tribunal held that:
a measure could be a de facto indirect expropriation by its effects
when the measure was adopted by the state, whether being of a reg-
ulatory nature or not, was permanent and irreversible, and the as-
sets and rights object of such a measure were affected in such a way
that was impossible to exploit such assets and rights, thus depriving
them of any economic value.”147 (all emphases added).
The Tribunal found that the Respondent breached its obligations
under the Agreement set forth in Articles 4(1) and 5(1).148  Accord-
ingly, the measure for non-renewal of the landfill was not justified by
environmental protection.
Regulatory Taking and Expropriatory Measures
In regulating their public interests, states may take measures or acts
that lead to a significant impairment of businesses.149  States may be
able to avoid paying compensation if they exercise their police pow-
ers.150  According to the doctrine of police powers, certain acts of
states are not subject to compensation under international law of ex-
propriation.151  However, the question remains whether there is a
heightened standard of review for state measures that result in the
economic destruction of an investment.152  In addition, what is the dif-
ference between these regulatory measures that do not give rise to
compensation and expropriatory measures that give rise to
compensation?
There is no comprehensive definition of what constitutes a regula-
tory taking measure.  However, some authors define regulatory taking
as “takings of property that fall within the police powers of a state, or
145. Id., para. 122.
146. Choudhury, supra note 1, at 794.
147. Tecmed decision, supra note 138. The original award is published in the Spanish lan-
guage. These quotes are derived from the Introductory Note 154,155, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC4873_En&caseId
=C3785.
148. Id. para. 201.
149. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 12-13.
150. Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law,
in NEW ASPECT OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 429 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas W. Walde
eds., 2007).
151. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 79.
152. Newcombe, supra note 150, at 429.
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otherwise arise from state measures like those pertaining to the regu-
lation of the environment, health, morals, culture or economy of a
host country.”153  Under international law, regulatory taking is ad-
dressed under the rubric of “expropriation.” However, not all regula-
tory measures are tantamount to expropriatory measures.154  Thus,
the European Court of Human Rights found no expropriation where
the investor did not totally lose the peaceful enjoyment of property
possession as long as he could continue to utilize their possession as
well as the possibility of selling the property subsisted.155
Generally, a state is not liable to pay compensation to the injured
party as a consequence of ‘bona fide regulation’ within the accepted
police powers of states.156  The Tribunal in Saluka Investments v.
Czech Republic, confirmed this view by stating that “[i]t is now estab-
lished in international law that states are not liable to pay compensa-
tion to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their
regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona
fide regulations that are aimed at the general welfare.”157  However,
“[t]here is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and tak-
ing begins.”158
States enjoy a broad discretion, under customary international law,
in regulating the environmental protection and public morals as long
as they exercise such powers on a fair, just, and non-discriminatory
basis.159  The U.S. Supreme Court delineated the borders through
which the concept of police power may work by stating that the police
power cannot go beyond the limit of:
. . .what is necessary and reasonable for guarding against the evil
which injures or threatens the public welfare in the given case, and
that the legislature cannot, under the guise [of that power]. . . strike
down innocent occupations and invade private property, the de-
struction and invasion of which are not reasonably necessary to ac-
complish the needed. . . reform . . . . Where the occupation . . . is in
153. Tienhaara, supra note 131, at 8.
154. The government conduct may affect foreign investment adversely through the passage of
an environmental regulation that has a disparate and adverse financial impact upon foreign in-
vestors. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007).
155. Wagner, supra note 41, at 524.
156. Id. at 517-18.
157. Saluka Investment v. Czech Republic, para. 255 92006, available at http://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/ files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf.
158. While a comparison of values of the assets before and after issuing the measure might be
relevant, it is by no means conclusive.  Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N. Y., 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962).
159. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 81.
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itself immoral, [there can be] no question of the power of the legis-
lature.160 (emphasis added)
Moreover, in some BITs, it is provided that expropriation should be
only for public purpose related to internal needs of the host state.161
In Methanex Corp. v. USA,162 the Tribunal found no expropriation
because the investor retained control of its subsidiaries and remained
able to sell gasoline additive outside the state of California.163  The
Tribunal decided that the “California ban was made for a public pur-
pose, was non-discriminatory and was accomplished with due process.
Hence, Methanex’s central claim under Article 1110(1) of expropria-
tion under one of the three forms of action in that provision fails.
From the standpoint of international law, the California ban was a
lawful regulation and not an expropriation.”164
However, there are a number of factors that might be taken into
account in determining the non-compensable regulatory measures and
the expropriatory measures.
The first factor is the “degree of interference.”  In Nykomb
Synergetics v. Latvia, the tribunal found that “‘regulatory takings’ may
under the circumstances amount to expropriation or the equivalent of
an expropriation.  The decisive factor for drawing the border line to-
wards expropriation must primarily be the degree of possession taking
or control over the enterprise the disputed measures entail.”165  In
testing expropriation, international tribunals have relied on “substan-
tial deprivation” that severely interferes with the utility of the invest-
ment property.  In Vivendi v. Argentina, the tribunal observed: “The
weight of authority . . . appears to draw a distinction between only a
partial deprivation of value (not an expropriation) and a complete or
near complete deprivation of value (expropriation).”166  Regulatory
measures do not normally reach the threshold of a ‘substantial depri-
vation.’167  For instance, in Feldman v. Mexico, an exporter of ciga-
rettes from Mexico was allegedly denied tax refund benefits.  The
160. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
161. Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of
Customary International Law, 14 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 327, 356 (1994).
162. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award (2005), http://www.state.gov/
documents /organization/51052.pdf.
163. Id. para. 1-2.
164. Id. para. 15; Hill, supra note 130, at 165-66.
165. Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, Arbitral Award,
para. 4.3.1 (2003), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0570.pdf.
166. Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Repub-
lic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3), Award, para. 7.5.11 (2007), http://www.italaw.com/ sites/de-
fault/files/case-documents /ita0215.pdf.
167. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 64.
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Tribunal found that there was no expropriation (although it found a
breach of the national treatment provision) since “the regulatory ac-
tion . . . has not deprived the claimant of control of . . . [his company],
interfered directly in the internal operations of . . . [the company] or
displaced the Claimant as the controlling shareholder.”168
Second, the “nature, purpose and character” of a measure are im-
portant factors in distinguishing between the indirect expropriation
and the non-compensable regulatory taking.169  If there is no legiti-
mate public purpose in the regulation, the measure should be compen-
sable.  The approach adopted by the U.S. Model BIT170 provides that
all the governmental measures that are issued for public purposes on a
non-discriminatory basis should not be compensated.171  Accordingly,
it is argued that environmental measures would fall under the rubric
of public purpose and thus should not be compensable regardless of
their impact on foreign investment.172  However, this approach would
give the states carte blanche to expropriate any foreign investment on
the basis of public purposes.  Nevertheless, tribunals recognized the
investor’s right to get compensation against expropriation even if it
was motivated by public purpose.173
The Tribunal in S.D. Myers, Inc. v Canada174 addressed the distinc-
tion between a compensable expropriation and the non-compensable
regulatory measure in addition to discussing the purpose of the mea-
sure.  The Claimant in this case, S.D. Myers, Inc. (“SDM”), was a U.S
corporation that claimed compensation against Canada as a result of
the latter’s closure of the boarders to trans-boundary movements of
168. Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1), Award, para. 152 (2002),
http://www.economia.gob.mx/files/comunidad_negocios/solucion_controversias/inversionista-es-
tado/casos_concluidos /Marvin_roy_Feldman_Karpa/laudo_ingles.pdf.
169. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 76.
170. There are some exceptions to non-discriminatory actions that are aimed to protect legiti-
mate objectives, such as the environment.
171. Justin R. Marlles, Public Purpose, Private Losses: Regulatory Expropriation and Environ-
mental Regulation in International Investment Law, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 275, 309
(2007).
172. Id.
173. For example, protecting the antiquities is a matter of public purpose of the state in com-
pliance with its international law obligations and the investor should be entitled to compensation
for any expropriation regulation justified by protecting antiquities.  An ICSID tribunal held that
“[t]he rules of Egyptian law and international law governing the exercise of the right of eminent
domain impose an obligation to indemnify parties whose legitimate rights are affected by such
exercise . . .. The obligation to pay fair compensation in the event of expropriation applies
equally where antiquities are involved.”  This case is known as Pyramids Case, Southern Pacific
Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3) 375
(1992), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&doc Id=DC671_En&caseId=C135.
174. S.D. Myers, supra note 92.
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polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCBs”)175 and PCB wastes.  SDM had a
business of disposal of PCB contaminated wastes and sought to im-
port PCBs from Canada to the U.S. to expand its disposal business.  In
1977, Canada added PCBs to the toxic substances and prohibited its
use in new products manufactured in or imported into Canada.176  In
the U.S., PCBs are primarily regulated under the federal Toxic Con-
trolled Substances Act (“TCSA”) within certain restrictions with the
exception of granting an operator exemption for one year if the activ-
ity would not result in unreasonable risk to human health or the envi-
ronment.177  Canada became a party to the Basel Convention by
which it is obliged to ensure that hazardous wastes are managed in an
environmentally sound manner.178  In 1990, SDM began its efforts to
obtain the necessary approvals to import from Canada electrical trans-
formers and other equipment containing PCB wastes into the U.S. .179
Canada’s policy, in line with the Basel Convention, was simply that
disposal of PCBs should take place in Canada.180  However, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued an “enforcement dis-
cretion” for the purpose of importing PCBs and PCB waste from
Canada into the U.S. for disposal.181  In 1995, SDMI was not able to
receive PCB from Canada for sixteen months due to the banning of
exports from Canada to the U.S and Canada’s closure of the bor-
der.182  SDMI claimed that Canada has violated its obligations under
NAFTA.183  The Tribunal, in discerning the purpose for issuing the
measure, stated that
Canada’s policy was shaped to a very great extent by the desire and
intent to protect and promote the market share of enterprises that
would carry out the destruction of PCBs in Canada and that were
owned by Canadian nationals . . . the Tribunal is satisfied that the
Interim Order and the Final Order favoured Canadian nationals
over non-nationals. The Tribunal is satisfied further that the practi-
cal effect of the Orders was that SDMI and its investment were pre-
vented from carrying out the business they planned to undertake,
which was a clear disadvantage in comparison to its Canadian com-
petitors . . .. The Tribunal finds that there was no legitimate environ-
mental reason for introducing the ban. Insofar as there was an
175. PCB is a chemical compound that was mainly used in electrical equipment.
176. S.D. Myers, supra note 92, para. 100.
177. Id., para. 102.
178. Id., para. 107.
179. Id., para. 109.
180. S.D. Meyers, supra note 92, para. 116.
181. Id., para. 118-19.
182. Terri L. Lilley, Keeping Nafta “Green” for Investors and the Environment, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 727, 735-36 (2002).
183. S.D. Myers, supra note 92, para. 130-31.
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indirect environmental objective - to keep the Canadian industry
strong in order to assure a continued disposal capability - it could
have been achieved by other measures.184
The Tribunal decided that the Interim Order and the Final Order
banning export of PCBs were ‘regulatory acts’ not amounting to ex-
propriation.185  It added:
Expropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights;
regulations a lesser interference. The distinction between expropria-
tion and regulation screens out most potential cases of complaints
concerning economic intervention by a state and reduces the risk
that governments will be subject to claims as they go about their
business of managing public affairs. An expropriation usually
amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make use
of its economic rights although it may be that, in some contexts and
circumstances, it would be appropriate to view a deprivation as
amounting to an expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary.
In this case the closure of the border was temporary . . .. [I]t does
not support the proposition on the facts of this case that the mea-
sure should be characterized as an expropriation within the terms of
Article 1110 . . .. It must look at the real interests involved and the
purpose and effect of the government measure.186
The Tribunal decided that Canada’s ban, although not tantamount
to expropriation, was a breach of its obligations under NAFTA that
caused harm to SDM and should be compensated.187
The Myers decision was criticized in Azurix v. Argentina188 where
the Tribunal found that the presence of a public purpose is not by
itself sufficient for determining whether compensation is owed.  In
1996, Azurix AGOSBA S.R.L. (“AAS”) and Operadora de Buenos
Aires S.R.L. (“OBA”) won the bid for a 30-year concession to provide
potable water and sewage services in the Province of Buenos Aires.
They incorporated Azurix Buenos Aires S.A. (“ABA”) to act as con-
cessionaire.189  On March 12, 2002, the Province terminated the Con-
cession Agreement, alleging ABA’s fault.190  Azurix initiated an
ICSID arbitration against Argentina seeking approximately US$600
million in compensation.  The Tribunal decided that:
the issue is not so much whether the measure concerned is legiti-
mate and serves a public purpose, but whether it is a measure that,
184. Id., para. 162, 193 & 195.
185. Id., para. 281.
186. Id., para. 282-84 & 286-87.
187. Id., para. 301.
188. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12), Award (2006), http://
italaw.com/doc uments/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf.
189. Id., para. 38-45.
190. Id., para. 245.
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being legitimate and serving a public purpose, should give rise to a
compensation claim. In the exercise of their public policy function,
governments take all sorts of measures that may affect the eco-
nomic value of investments without such measures giving rise to a
need to compensate . . .. The argument made by the S.D. Myers
tribunal is somehow contradictory. According to it, the BIT would
require that investments not be expropriated except for a public
purpose and that there be compensation if such expropriation takes
place and, at the same time, regulatory measures that may be tanta-
mount to expropriation would not give rise to a claim for compensa-
tion if taken for a public purpose. The public purpose criterion as an
additional criterion to the effect of the measures under considera-
tion needs to be complemented.191
The Tribunal deemed the “public purpose” criterion as insufficient
and added additional elements that may provide useful guidance to
decide whether regulatory measures would be expropriatory and give
rise to compensation.192  Furthermore, there should be a “real risk” of
harming the environment, which qualifies the measure to be issued for
a legitimate public purpose, not a disguised, “unreal” purpose.  Ac-
cordingly, the Tribunal in Tecmed193 decided that “the absence of any
evidence that the operation of the Landfill was a real or potential
threat to the environment or to the public health . . . do not constitute
a real crisis or disaster of great proportions, triggered by acts or omis-
sions committed by the foreign investor or its affiliates.”194
However, in Santa Elena v Costa Rica,195 where Compan˜ı´a del
Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A., the Claimant, claimed compensation
191. Id., para. 310-11.
192. The Tribunal cited the James case in the European Court of Human Rights to refer to the
additional elements to be taken into consideration by stating that “a measure depriving a person
of his property [must] pursue, on the facts as well as in principle, a legitimate aim ‘in the public
interest,’” and bear “a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed
and the aim sought to be realized.”  This proportionality will not be found if the person con-
cerned bears “an individual and excessive burden.” The Court considered that such “a measure
must be both appropriate for achieving its aim and not disproportionate thereto.”  The Court
found relevant that non-nationals “will generally have played no part in the election or designa-
tion of its [of the measure] authors nor have been consulted on its adoption,” and observed that
“there may well be legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the
public interest than non-nationals.’” Azurix, supra note 188, para. 311; see also Case of James
and Others v. The United Kingdom (Application No. 8793/79) (1986), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search. aspx?i=001-57507#{“item id”:[“001-57507”]}.
193. Tecmed decision, supra note 138, para. 127, 132.
194. Id., para. 144.
195. Compan˜ia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID Case
No. ARB/96/1), Final Award (2000), http://italaw.com/documents/santaelena_award.pdf.
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from Costa Rica Republic due to an act of expropriation by the latter
of a property known as “Santa Elena.”196  The Tribunal held that
the purpose of protecting the environment for which the property
was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which
adequate compensation must be paid. The international source of
the obligation to protect the environment makes no difference . . ..
[E]xpropriatory environmental measures—no matter how laudable
and beneficial to society as a whole—are, in this respect, similar to
any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to
implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for en-
vironmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s
obligation to pay compensation remains.197
This award paid no particular attention to environmental purposes
for issuing the measure that was the basis for compensation.  This en-
vironmental purpose did not alter the government’s obligation to
compensate the investor. In other words, the international rules for
investment protection took precedence over any rules of environmen-
tal protection. This may pose some dilemmas in which states may be
prevented from interference, though justified, by effective environ-
mental measures to fulfill its environmental obligations as this inter-
ference would be costly thereafter and needs to be financed.
The third factor that might be taken into account is the “duration of
the measure”. The Tribunal, in Azurix, differentiated between a single
measure and multiple measures by which it will depend on the dura-
tion of their cumulative effect, and this should be judged on a case-by-
case basis as there is no mathematical formula to reach a mechanical
result.198  Accordingly, to be considered expropriatory, a measure
should have a destructive and long-lasting effect on the economic
value of the investment and its benefit to the investor.199 Finally, the
Tribunal found no expropriation in this case as:
the impact on the investment attributable to the Province’s actions
was not to the extent required to find that, in the aggregate, these
actions amounted to an expropriation; Azurix did not lose the at-
tributes of ownership, at all times continued to control ABA and its
ownership of 90% of the shares was unaffected. No doubt the man-
agement of ABA was affected by the Province’s actions, but not
sufficiently for the Tribunal to find that Azurix’s investment was
expropriated.200
196. Id., para. 3. It is worth-mentioning that both parties agreed that Claimant deserves com-
pensation and Respondent concurred with Claimant that the core issue to be resolved was the
amount of compensation owed to Claimant for the expropriation of the Property. Id., para. 34.
197. Id., para. 71-72.
198. Id., para. 313.
199. UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 63.
200. Azurix, supra note 188, para. 322.
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Moreover, in order to justify such exercise of the police power,
“there must be ‘an average reciprocity of advantage’ as between the
owner of the property restricted and the rest of the community.”201
Furthermore, there should be a reasonable correlation between the
harm suffered and the measure taken to prevent or eliminate this
harm. Arbitral tribunals refer to this correlation by proportionality.
The Tribunal, in Tecmed v. Mexico, held that “a regulatory measure
could be an indirect expropriation by its characteristics when there
was a lack of proportionality between the measure, the interest sought
to be protected by such a measure and the protection of the invest-
ment, and as a result the economic value of the investment was de-
stroyed.”202  This standard appears to lie somewhere between the
requirement that there should be a plausible basis for the measure and
the requirement that the measure be the least restrictive necessary in
order to meet the objectives of the Government.203  In Feldman v.
Mexico, the Tribunal noted that:
[G]overnments must be free to act in the broader public interest
through protection of the environment, new or modified tax re-
gimes, the granting or withdrawal of government subsidies, reduc-
tions or increases in tariff levels, imposition of zoning restrictions
and the like. Reasonable governmental regulation of this type can-
not be achieved if any business that is adversely affected may seek
compensation, and it is safe to say that customary international law
recognizes this.204
However, the Tribunal in Azinian v. Mexico, required the govern-
ment to intervene broadly in the investors’ expectations before award-
ing compensation.205  In the 2000 S.D. Myers, an arbitrator wrote
separately to emphasize that investors should expect regulatory
change: “Expropriations without compensation tend to upset an
owner’s reasonable expectations concerning what belongs to him, in
law and in fairness.  Regulation is something that owners ought rea-
sonably to expect.  It generally does not amount to an unfair
surprise.”206
Although international tribunals have not agreed on a definitive
test to compensating the indirect expropriation through regulatory
201. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922).
202. Tecmed decision, supra note 138, at 155.
203. Newcombe, supra note 150, at 430-31.
204. Feldman, supra note 168, para. 103.
205. Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian & Ellen Baca v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
97/2), para. 83 (1999), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId =DC544_En&caseId=C156.
206. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada.  Separate Opinion by Dr. Bryan Schwartz (on the Partial
Award), para. 213 (2000), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0748.pdf.
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taking, they frequently refer to factors similar to those described by
the U.S. Supreme Court.207  In Fireman’s Fund v. Mexico, the Tribunal
found that:
[T]o distinguish between a compensable expropriation and a non-
compensable regulation by a host [s]tate, the following factors (usu-
ally in combination) may be taken into account: whether the mea-
sure is within the recognized police powers of the host [s]tate; the
(public) purpose and effect of the measure; whether the measure is
discriminatory; the proportionality between the means employed
and the aim sought to be realized; and the bona fide nature of the
measure.208
Practically, under this test, the government is rarely held liable for
regulatory action that leaves some economic value.209
Accordingly, the thin line between the non-compensable regulatory
measure and the compensable expropriatory measure is basically the
extent of interference in the utility of the investment property.  While
the compensable expropriatory measure deprives the investor of the
total or substantive utility or control of the property, the non-compen-
sable regulatory measure does not reach such degree of interference.
Accordingly, permanent or long-term measures and the measures that
have severe economic impact should be likely tantamount to expropri-
ation.  Furthermore, arbitrators may consider the following criteria in
assessing the legitimacy of the measure: a) the economic impact of the
measure, i.e., the degree of interference with the property right (in-
cluding interference with the investor’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations); b) its purpose;210 and c) the duration of the measure.211
207. Under U.S. law, governmental taking of property for public use is prohibited without just
compensation. In Penn Cent. Transportation v. City of New York, where the U.S. Supreme
Court first recognized what has been called “regulatory takings.”  The court held that “[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. . . So, too, is the character of the governmental action.  A “taking” may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government . . . than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the bene-
fits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  Accordingly, in order for the regulatory measure to be
tantamount to compensable expropriation, it has to be examined against the following three
items: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent of interference
with the property owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of
the governmental action.  Subedi, supra note 76, at 130; see also Wagner, supra note 41, at 504-06
& 520.
208. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Mexico, (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01), Award, para. 176
(2006), http:// www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0331.pdf.
209. Wang, supra note 5, at 26; see also Wagner, supra note 41, at 509.
210. Tienhaara, supra note 131, at 8.
211. Wagner, supra note 41, at 525-26.
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INTERACTION BETWEEN INVESTMENT AND ENVIRONMENT
A conflict between environment and trade or investment does not
always arise.  Not all investments result in environmental harm, nor
does environmental protection always affect investments.  Of course,
excessive environmental measures sometimes quash foreign invest-
ment and may lead to unfair competitive advantage for domestic busi-
ness. On the other hand, over-regulation can create a vacuum of
mutual mistrust and animosity.212
In this section, we will, first, discuss the general obligations of the
states towards the environment, followed by explaining the state’s ca-
pacity to issue environmental measures.  Third, we will point out the
overlap between investment protection and the environmental protec-
tion in which we discuss some investment treaties that deal with envi-
ronmental concerns, the environmental impact on BITs language and
interpretation, followed, finally, by explaining the possibility of com-
pensating the environmental measures.
State’s Responsibility Towards The Environment
Earlier, we explored the fundamental tenets of environmental law
and the basic principles that govern the environmental protection.213
Building on that discussion, states have certain obligations in preserv-
ing these environmental principles especially when the environment is
threatened by harmful investment activities.
In encountering the potential risks that threaten the environment,
governments have to determine the appropriate level of protection
required to encounter these risks, which is a political decision in the
foremost.  This political decision might involve different elements to
balance, including the valuable benefits that the risky investment pro-
vides for the country.214  Governments, in response to the environ-
mental risks, should enjoy the ability to enhance its environmental
protection even if it includes the right to impose stricter standards.215
The protection of the environment is basically the responsibility of
the states. IIAs provide states’ governments with the right to regulate
their environment.  Sometimes, the parties to IIAs undertake not to
lower the environmental standards in order to attract FDI.216
212. Lilley, supra note 182, at 740-41.
213. See supra Part I.
214. Wagner, supra note 41, at 533-34.
215. Id.
216. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 63.
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States have a general obligation of satisfactory environment, which
obliges their governments to take reasonable measures to prevent
ecological degradation in addition to securing the ecologically sustain-
able development and use of natural resources.217  Furthermore, gov-
ernments should be cautious in dealing with the environmental
measures in order not to lose such advantage of FDI.218
The Capacity of States to Issue Environmental Measures
Out of its sovereignty, each state has the legitimate right to regulate
every aspect inside its territory including environmental issues.  States
may incorporate in the IIAs the so-called “non-lowering of standards”
clause which aims at suppressing the intention of the host state to
lower its environmental standards as an incentive to attract foreign
investment.219  Furthermore, states may provide exceptions to the
general prohibition on the imposition of performance requirements in
many IIAs.220  NGOs often argue that investment treaties secure the
export of highly polluting industries into the developing world, so, in-
vestment treaties should contain exemptions for host states to protect
the environment.  A few treaties on investment, such as NAFTA,221
responded to this concern.222  On the other hand, foreign investment
might be jeopardized by environmental and resource mismanagement
that reduce the availability of key natural resources for investment.223
States should protect the environment through legitimate regula-
tions. In assessing the legitimacy of the regulation, a distinction should
be drawn between risk assessment and risk management.  Risk assess-
ment refers to the legitimate goal of the government while risk man-
agement refers to the methods by which this regulation deals with the
risk.224  The regulation might be justified by a minority scientific opin-
ion about the risks that are posed to the environment.  However, the
state should assess the availability of a reasonable and less restrictive
alternative to address the risk.225  On the other hand, governments, in
some instances, eclectically chip away at the value of foreign invest-
217. Juliane Kokott & Thomas Diehn, Decision Regarding Communication 155/96, in Interna-
tional Decisions (Bernard H. Oxman ed.) 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 937, 939 (2002).
218. Vadi, supra note 39, at 811.
219. Footer, supra note 8, at 45. Article 1114(2) of NAFTA recognizes that it is “inappropriate
to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.”
220. Footer, supra note 8, at 42.
221. NAFTA art. 1114(2).
222. Newcombe, supra note 150, at 426-27.
223. For example, Zimbabwe’s gold reserves are quickly depleting as a result of unfettered
mining operations. See Martin, supra note 31, at 245-46.
224. KAHN ET AL., supra note 48, at 426.
225. Id. at 427.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB201.txt unknown Seq: 33 26-MAY-16 14:10
2015] INVESTMENT-ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES 165
ments in their country by using environmental regulation as a sort of
“trojan horse” to benefit their domestic competitors, or appeasing
anti-foreigner populist sentiments for political purposes.226  This abuse
of environmental regulations was manifested in the Sakhalin case.227
Foreign investors encroach the authority of the host state upon its
domestic policymaking, including regulating the environment, when
they challenge the environmental regulations. This is considered an
indirect way of controlling the host state’s policy over the environ-
ment and resisting any attempt to strengthen its environmental pro-
tection measures.228
Environmental Implications of International Investments
The mindset of the nineteenth century was to perceive the environ-
ment as a commodity for exploitation, and hence, it was not necessary
to consider the impact of commercial activities on it.  This approach
has been directed to investment by focusing on the foreign investors’
interests at the expense of the host states’ interests in protecting the
environment.  This conceptualization needed to shift away to operate
the investment in an ecologically sustainable environment.229  The
High Commissioner for Human Rights assured that investors’ rights
should be utilized to serve wider goals such as sustainable human de-
velopment, economic growth, stability, and protection of human
rights.230
226. Marlles, supra note 171, at 332.
227. In 1994, Royal Dutch Shell company agreed with Russia to exploit a vast oil and natural
gas field.  The price of gas and oil steadily arose and the government asked Shell to renegotiate
the initial agreement due to environmental concerns.  Shell refused the renegotiation claiming
that its performance was within the limits of Russian environmental laws.  In return, the govern-
ment revoked a key environmental permit for the project, and threatening to sue it criminally for
the destruction of the forest.  Moreover, Shell and its foreign partners agreed to give Gazprom,
an energy company controlled by the Russian government, a 50% plus one share stake.  As a
result of the new agreement, “Mitsui’s share drops from 25% to 12.5%, and Mitsubishi’s from
20% to 10%,” while Shell’s share drops from 55% to 27.5%.  The actions of the Russian govern-
ment constituted regulatory expropriation. See, Marlles, supra note 171, at 333.  In addition,
there are numerous recent examples of environmental malpractice by foreign investors in host
developing states.  The disputes have involved allegations of environmental devastation, contam-
ination of lands and rivers, ravaged rainforest, and damage to human health.  Notable examples
include operations of the Shell Oil Company in Nigeria, Freeport and Rio Tinto in Indonesia,
ChevronTexaco Corporation in Ecuador, Broken Hill Proprietary Company (“BHP”) in Ok
Tedi, Papua New Guinea, and Union Carbide in Bhopal, India.  For more details see Miles,
supra note 78, at 27.
228. Miles, supra note 78, at 41.
229. Id. at 24.
230. Human Rights, Trade and Investment. Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9 (2003), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4
fa6a6515bb18/Stabilization%2BPaper.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
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Traditionally, national laws were the legal tools for addressing envi-
ronmental concerns, along with codes of conduct adopted by corpora-
tions and industry groups.  More recently, IIAs have focused on
environmental concerns.231  IIAs determine the balance between in-
vestor protection and environmental protection, which became one of
the top priorities for societies and an important element of treaty
negotiations.232
States are expected to take responsible measures to regulate the
environment while facilitating he foreign investment.  However, they
should apply environmental regulations consistently to promote fair
competition between domestic and foreign investors.233  Inconsistent
application of environmental standards may result in a disadvantage
to non-complying competitors who save the costs of compliance with
these standards.234
IIAs often refer to foreign investors’ obligations towards the envi-
ronment and the extent to which the host state may interfere with the
foreign investment based on environmental justifications.  We will ex-
amine this aspect of IIAs, and consider both treaties of NAFTA and
CAFTA in relation to environmental implications of the foreign in-
vestment.  Then, we present the environmental impact upon the IIAs
languages and interpretation. Finally, we discuss the compensability of
environmental measures.
IIAs: Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties
IIAs include bilateral (“BITs”) and multilateral investment treaties
(“MITs”).  BIT is considered the most important legal instrument in
protecting foreign investment.235  There is a growing number of BITs
that govern foreign investments.236  Since 1960, BITs were created to
provide a stable international legal framework for the regulation of
direct foreign investment.237  Treaty provisions do not often provide
precise definitions of the standards of protection, potentially creating
231. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 72.
232. A survey on the IIAs that contain environmental language is available at http://www
.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/46905672.pdf at 30, 33.
233. Martin, supra note 31, at 216-18.
234. Id.
235. Since a very early time, there existed treaties to promote and protect trade taking the
form of “friendship, commerce and navigation” (“FCN”). See Sornarajah, supra note 34, at 180.
236. In 1990, there were 435 bilateral investment agreements (BITs).  By the end of the mil-
lennium the number of BITs increased to 2,600 treaties. See Sornarajah, supra note 34, at 172;
2012 US MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, http://www.state.gov/documents/organizatio
n/188371.pdf (last visited at March 20, 2016).
237. David R. Adair, Investors’ Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment Treaties, 6
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 195, 197 (1999).
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a tension between these standards and the regulatory measures
adopted by states that interfere with foreign investments.238  BITs are
introduced as a “remedial documents” to ensure that foreign invest-
ments are subject to the rule of law.239  They are made on an ad hoc
basis to be negotiated for the parties’ mutual interests and serve as a
solution in the absence of consensus to multilateral norms.240  BITs
provide the parties with an opportunity to observe unified investment
norms in each other’s territory.241
NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) is an at-
tempt to reconcile the conflict between the investment and the envi-
ronment by incorporating self-standing provisions for protecting both.
It addresses explicitly the environmental effects of the free trade be-
tween its member states.242  Furthermore, NAFTA includes certain
provisions approving environmental regulation that do not appear in
other investment agreements.243
In 1993, in order for NAFTA parties to recognize the interrelation-
ship of their environment,244 they concluded a parallel agreement i.e.,
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(“NAAEC”) to protect and enhance the environment in their territo-
ries.245  NAAEC was created primarily to support the environmental
goals and objectives of NAFTA.246  Both agreements represent impor-
tant precedents for reconciling the tension between economic devel-
opment and environmental protection.  They were hailed as
landmarks in providing for environmental protection within a free-
238. Vadi, supra note 39, at 824.
239. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES HISTORY, POLICY, AND IN-
TERPRETATION, 2 (Oxford University Press, 2010).
240. Sornarajah, supra note 34, at 183.
241. Id. at 184.
242. HUNTER, ET AL, supra note 2, at 1308.  Article 1114(2) of NAFTA entitled (Environmen-
tal Measures) reads “The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures”.  North American Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1114(2), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), available at https://
www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-TradeAgreement#A1114.
243. Gantz, supra note 128, at 10651.
244. Francisco S. Nogales, The Nafta Environmental Framework, Chapter 11 Investment Pro-
visions, and the Environment, 8 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 97, 104 (2002).
245. North American Agreement On Environmental Cooperation, U.S. – Can. – Mex. (1993),
http://www.cec. org/sites/default/files/naaec.pdf [hereinafter NAAEC].
246. Id., art. 1(d) (“Objectives”).
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trade agreement.247  They provide a special status for environmental
protection.248
Due to their impact over all areas of law, including environmental
law, the trade agreements are given a “quasi-constitutional” legal sta-
tus which affect governments to act in certain ways and to withdraw or
amend specific measures.249  The impact of trade law on the environ-
ment led to the creation of the Commission for Environmental Coop-
eration (“CEC”)250 under the NAAEC.251  CEC was established to
address the regional environmental concerns between the parties,252
and promote the enforcement of environmental law.  CEC is adminis-
tered by a council, which is responsible for further consultation and
cooperation among the parties to avoid the environment-related trade
disputes and develop recommendation regarding environmental mat-
ters that are related to economic development.253  The only problem
with CEC is that it is not an enforcement agency.254  Nevertheless,
CEC has the potential to achieve significant environmental results
over the long run.255
Chapter 11 of NAFTA deals with the investment established in each
contracting party (USA, Mexico, and Canada) by an investor from
another contracting party.  It raises fundamental concerns about the
tension between investment protection and trans-border natural re-
sources256 and whether the process of resolving this tension is ade-
quate or there are more appropriate processes to be used.257  Chapter
11 was created as a security for investors, which was widely viewed as
247. Lilley, supra note 182, at 727.
248. Julia Ferguson, California’s Mtbe Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the Need for an
Environmental Interpretive Note on Article 1110 of Nafta, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
499, 501 (2000).
249. Howard Mann, Nafta and the Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
387, 391-92 (2000).
250. NAAEC, supra note 245, art. 8. “The Commission
The Parties hereby establish the Commission for Environmental Cooperation.
The Commission shall comprise a Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advisory
Committee.”
251. Mann, supra note 249, at 394.
252. NAAEC, supra note 245, art. 10(f).
253. Id., art. 10(l).
254. Nogales, supra note 244, at 106.
255. Mann, supra note 249, at 394 (“NAFTA negotiations also led to the creation of two
Mexico-United States border institutions, the North American Development Bank (NADBank)
and the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) . . . Nevertheless, the man-
date of these two bodies does not extend to the relationship between trade law and environmen-
tal concerns.”).
256. Paul Stanton Kibel & Jonathan R. Schutz, RIO Grande Designs: Texans’ NAFTA Water
Claim Against Mexico, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 228, 242-43 (2007).
257. Id. at 266.
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a critical factor in the rapid expansion of foreign direct investment.258
Investment and foreign investors are protected under NAFTA from
certain kinds of governmental measures.  The meaning of measure is
very broad to include all legislations adopted by the host state or any
of its organs, whether laws, regulations, or administrative decisions,
having an impact on investment. Simply, investors are protected from
nearly all forms of governmental actions.259
NAFTA environmental provisions are to be applied properly by its
parties in a way that permits each party to set its own levels of envi-
ronmental protection and enforce them without lowering their envi-
ronmental standards (race to the bottom scenario) nor fabricating
environmental pretext (race to the top scenario).260  Article 1105 of
NAFTA refers to the minimum standards of treatment to investors,
which should be in accordance with international law.261  The phrase
“international law” includes customary international law, interna-
tional environmental principles, or international environmental trea-
ties.  Investors can claim the unfair treatment262 or expropriation263
based on environmental measures.
NAFTA allows investors to proceed directly against the govern-
ment of the host state through international arbitration.  The major
arbitration system is administered by the World Bank by the Interna-
tional Center for the Settlement of Investor Disputes (“ICSID”).264
However, Civil Society Organizations (“CSOs”) considered
NAAEC a weak and ineffectual instrument265 that failed to address
the environmental concerns.  Due to the massive number of cases ini-
tiated under NAFTA, CSOs suggest to review NAFTA system.266  In
addition, the language of NAFTA is unclear in relation to the conflict
between environmental concerns and investor’s rights and which one
should prevail.267  Nonetheless, some authors argue that no tribunal
created under NAFTA Chapter 11 has relied extensively on the envi-
ronmental provisions.268  Furthermore, some NAFTA scholars suggest
258. Mann, supra note 249, at 402-03.
259. Nogales, supra note 244, at 109.
260. Lilley, supra note 182, at 746; Ferguson, supra note 248, at 505.
261. NAFTA art. 1105, http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp.
262. Todd Weiler, A First Look at the Interim Merits Award in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada: It Is
Possible to Balance Legitimate Environmental Concerns with Investment Protection, 24 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 184-85 (2001).
263. Kahn, supra note 31, at 424.
264. See infra at Part IV(A).
265. Footer, supra note 8, at 38-39.
266. Mann, supra note 249, at 388-89.
267. The issue of interpretation and language of BITs is discussed infra at Part III(C)(2).
268. Gantz, supra note 128, at 10647.
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that future tribunals may take into consideration the following: (a) the
claimant’s standing; (b) the reflection of the environmental regulation
of thorough risk assessment, based on scientific data and its consis-
tency with national law and procedural due process; (c) the discrimi-
natory nature of the environmental regulation whether de jure or de
facto discrimination against foreign investors; and (d) the degree of
substantial interference of the measure with investor’s property.269
CAFTA
The Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is an expan-
sion of NAFTA to five Central American nations (Guatemala, El Sal-
vador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua), and the Dominican
Republic. CAFTA has been billed as a free trade agreement that is
“greener” than NAFTA.  CAFTA’s supporters argue that its environ-
mental provisions would increase the level of economic activities
while avoiding environmental degradation.270  However, CAFTA con-
tains different procedural and substantive provisions that may affect
the outcome of environment-related disputes.271  Thus far, there have
been three publicized investor-state cases under the auspices of
CAFTA.272  Unlike NAEEC, CAFTA has omitted an advisory body
of environmental experts to review environmental matters.273
CAFTA is considered the “fetus of NAFTA,”274 which has exacer-
bated the “race to the bottom”275 in environmental standards.276
Many provisions of CAFTA are mirrored, in language and meaning,
from NAFTA’s Chapter 11.277  Despite the similarities between the
provisions of CAFTA and NAFTA, there are still some differences
between them.  Article 10.7 of CAFTA defines “expropriation” by re-
ferring to Annexes 10—B and 10—C of CAFTA’s Investment Chap-
ter, whereas Article 1110 of NAFTA contains no such reference
269. Gantz, supra note 89, at 740-41.
270. Wang, supra note 5, at 255.
271. Id. at 254.
272. See R.R Dev. Corp. v. Guat.; Pac.Rim Cayman, L.L.C. v. Republic of El Sal.; Commerce
Grp. Corp. v. Republic of El Sal., http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=1046#cases.
273. Wang, supra note 5, at 274.
274. Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental Protection in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Under CAFTA: Lessons from the NAFTA Legitimacy Crisis, 8 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 103, 18 (2007).
275. This is a socioeconomic concept that reflects deregulation of business environment in
order to attract or retain economic activity with lower environmental protection.
276. Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.
org/Page.aspx?pid =1046 (last visited at March 20, 2015).
277. For example, defining what actions by participating countries constitute “national treat-
ment,” “most favored nation treatment,” and measures equivalent to prohibited
“expropriations.”
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addenda.278  This interpretative addenda would ease the tribunals’
mission in interpreting the term “expropriation” in consistent man-
ner.  Due to the absence of such interpretative addenda in NAFTA,
tribunals, in NAFTA disputes, would have the discretion in interpret-
ing the term expropriation, which would lead to inconsistency be-
tween arbitral tribunals in defining and interpreting expropriation
under NAFTA.279
The second difference between both treaties is the degree of trans-
parency in the arbitral proceedings.280  There is a major reform intro-
duced by CAFTA for the openness of the arbitral proceedings and
providing greater transparency281 unlike the secretive nature of
NAFTA’s disputes, which denies important groups, such as environ-
mental NGOs, from the opportunity to present their views to the
tribunals.282  CAFTA authorizes the arbitral tribunals the discretion to
accept the amicus curiae submissions.283
In addition, CAFTA has introduced an appellate review body for
the purpose of “prompt review and, where warranted, correction of
final administrative actions regarding matters covered by this Agree-
ment.”284  This appellate body helps in scrutinizing the arbitral
awards, correcting its flaws, and providing a greater uniformity in in-
terpreting CAFTA’s provisions.285  It would protect the environmen-
tal legislation from frivolous challenges as it will review the claims
decided by the tribunals, including the legitimacy of the environmen-
tal measures.  This body will limit the future challenges of environ-
mental regulations to the cases where there is sufficient harm only as a
matter of law, which promote the consistency and efficiency of the
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.286
278. Annex 10—B expresses the signatory countries’ commitment to using customary interna-
tional law to interpret the standards contained in Chapter 10, including Article 10.7.  Annex 10—
C lays out interpretive rules for how arbitral panels are to determine what actions qualify as
“indirect expropriations. USTR Office, Central America Free Trade Agreement, June 1, 2004,
art. 10.7 and Annex—B, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_
upload_file328_4718.pdf (last visited at March 20, 2016); Byrnes, supra note 274, at 21.
279. Byrnes, supra note 274, at 21.
280. Id. at 22.
281. Id. at 34; See also infra at Part IV(B).
282. Byrnes, supra note 274, at 34.
283. CAFTA, supra note 278, at art. 10.20(3).
284. Id., art. 18.5.  This regime will be discussed infra in Part VII “Proposed Regimes.”
285. Byrnes, supra note 274, at 45.
286. Id. at 46.
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Environmental Impact on BITs Language and Interpretation
Environmental concerns have their implications upon the invest-
ment treaties whether in relation to the language used to refer to
these concerns in the treaties or the tools to be used in interpreting
the environmental-related treaty provisions.  We discuss the languages
used in the treaties that refer to the environmental concerns and then
analyze the interpretative tools used in interpreting these provisions.
Environmental Impact on BITs Language
Generally, BITs refer to the environmental concerns in generic
terms, primarily in the preamble or general provisions, by assuring the
need to protect the environment and sometimes linked to the princi-
ple of sustainable development.  Furthermore, the methods of refer-
ring to environmental concerns vary in BITs.  First, the parties may
prefer to ignore the environmental issues.  Second, environmental is-
sues may be addressed in general or hortatory provisions.  Third, they
may be addressed in specific clauses that affirm the host state’s powers
to protect environment, including the pledge not to lower environ-
mental standards to attract investment.287  The references are often
mentioned among other concerns in hortatory language, for example
as one feature to environmental concerns, among others, of sustaina-
ble development, or as a general exception, or as an explicit recogni-
tion that parties shall not relax environmental standards to attract
investment; and finally, as an element of corporate social responsibil-
ity standards.288
Results from the 2010 Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (“OECD”) survey showed that references to envi-
ronmental concerns appear only in a fraction of investment agree-
287. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 36-41.  An example of the general reference
to environmental concerns was the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention (Lom. . . IV), under article 77,
actual mention is made of investment in connection with environmental concerns. Id. at 15-16;
an example of particular reference to the environment is found under Article 32 of Contonou
Agreement entitled “Environment and natural resources”, provides for cooperation in relation
to the protection of specified areas of the environment. In stronger language, the Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-boundary Context, signed by over 25 European
countries, Canada and the United States, provides, in article 2(1), that: “1.  The Parties shall,
either individually or jointly, take all appropriate and effective measures to prevent, reduce and
control significant adverse trans-boundary environmental impact from proposed activities.”  Id
at 17.
288. Trade and Development Board, supra note 46, at 9 n. g.  The preamble of the United
States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012) reads “Desiring to achieve these objectives in a
manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the environment . . . .”
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ments, but are becoming much more common in new treaties.289
Environmental concerns became a constant feature in investment
treaties since the inception of NAFTA.290  There are around 66 IIAs
and 2 model BITs that contain preamble clauses on environmental
concerns.291  On the other hand, such references may take the form of
assertions that the agreements’ provisions will not prevent the parties
from regulating environmental issues or, alternatively, affirming the
state’s right to regulate environmental matters in compliance with in-
ternational environmental agreements, with the undertaking not to
lower environmental standards for attracting FDI.292  Furthermore,
there are some environmental agreements that contain direct refer-
ence to FDI.293
Some recent investment treaties contain substantive provisions re-
lating to health and the environment.  For instance, many recent U.S.
BITs provide that “[n]othing in this Treaty shall be construed to pre-
vent a Party from adopting, maintaining[,] or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a man-
ner sensitive to environmental concerns.”  Such clauses are called
“non-precluded measures clauses” (“NPM clauses”), which protect
certain types of state conduct from liability under the substantive stan-
dards of protection.294
Some authors have criticized not only the hortatory language of the
environmental reference in investment treaties with unenforceable
feature, up to no more than consultations among parties,295 but also
the vague clauses that require consistency of the environmental mea-
sures with treaty provisions.296  This poor drafting of investment trea-
ties undermines the power of the host state to adopt and implement
environmental and sustainable development policies.297
289. Julianne J. Marley, The Environmental Endangerment Finding in International Invest-
ment Disputes, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1003, 1015-16 (2014).
290. NAFTA, art. 1114(2), https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-Ameri-
can-Free-Trade-Agreement.
291. OECD, Harnessing Freedom of Investment for Green Growth, 37, http://www.oecd.org/
investment/intern ationalinvestmentagreements/46905672.pdf (last visited March 20, 2016).
292. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 3-4.
293. Id. at 14.
294. Rahim Moloo, Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liability
Under Investment Treaties, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 8-9 (2011).
295. For instance, the breach of NAFTA Article 1114(1) would give rise to no more than
consultations among parties.
296. Vadi, supra note 39, at 824.
297. Id. at 870.
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These arguments support the concept that environmental concerns
should be explicitly addressed in IIAs.  Since addressing the environ-
mental concerns in a general or hortatory provisions might give the
parties the feeling that environmental concerns resemble sonorous
speeches that people only listen to but they are not convinced nor
obliged by.  On the other hand, incorporating specific environmental
standards in BITs may lead to many problems as whether these envi-
ronmental standards are exhaustive or non-exhaustive and they would
be difficult to be amended.  Accordingly, it has been suggested that
environmental concerns should be addressed directly in a clear cut
provisions giving the state the power to protect its environment with-
out harming the investor’s property in light of the agreed upon stan-
dards to be negotiated between the state and the investors in a
transparent way.  These provisions should reflect the importance of
environmental concerns on the international arena that escalate the
states’ obligations of preserving its environment to the level of jus
cogens norms.298  These provisions would acquire this nature from
their purpose i.e., to preserve the environment, which would affect
human’s health and life and parties cannot agree to any provisions
that adversely affect human’s health and life.299
MNEs must either become environmentally responsible, or face the
risk of financial loss as the global environment declines.300  At the
end, in incorporating environmental standards in BITs, there should
be a balancing of at least two sets of arguments.  First, the prescription
of certain standards could in some circumstances amount to a form of
disguised protectionism.  Second, the need to promote certain envi-
ronmental standards may outweigh certain negative impacts on invest-
ment growth and possibly, on intellectual property rights.301
298. Jus cogens is defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as “a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”
299. “. . . Jus cogens has no ascertainable basis. Although there is no simple criterion by which
to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens, the concept
of jus cogens is positive law . . . Given the legal uncertainty surrounding the term, it is up to
international adjudicating bodies to decipher the complex tapestry of international law in deter-
mining its meaning.”  Vadi, supra note 39, at 857-58.
300. Martin, supra note 31, at 246-47.
301. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 72.
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Environmental Impact on BITs Interpretation
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the prevailing in-
strument in interpreting investment treaties.302  Treaty provisions
should be given an ordinary meaning, not a technical one and should
be interpreted in light of the objects of the treaty itself which might be
stated clearly, whether in the preamble of the treaty or any other pro-
visions, or discerned from the whole provisions.  Article 31(1) strikes a
balance between the text of a treaty and its context, object, and pur-
pose to appear as complementary to avoid the notorious battles be-
tween the language and purpose of a given text.303
These interpretation rules are considered a configuration of custom-
ary international law rules of interpretation.304  Nevertheless “it is dif-
ficult to find a tribunal which formally and properly applied the
Vienna Rules step by step.”305  However, the tribunal in Metalclad,
applying Article 102(2) of NAFTA,306 interpreted the Article 1105(1)
guarantee as a minimum standard of treatment under international
law in terms of Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties307 and indicated that domestic legal regimes cannot be
relied upon to escape honoring international obligations.308
Arbitral tribunals have rarely addressed the non-investment law
principles, as they are rarely invoked by foreign investors in invest-
302. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
303. Gary Born, Should Investment Treaties Have Their Own Rules of Interpretation?, Kluwer
Arbitration Blog (2015).
304. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 case, the ICJ observed that the principles of treaty inter-
pretation “are reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary international
law on the point” (Judgment of November 12, 1991, ICJ Reports 53 (1991), at 70).
305. IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 730, 746 (Christina Binder et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2009).
This view was confirmed in a dissenting opinion of Jan Paulsson in Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d.
v. Slovenia (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24). See Dissenting Opinion to the Decision on the Treaty
Interpretation Issue of June 12, 2009, 44), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1091_En&caseId=C69.
306. Article 1.2(2) entitled objectives and reads “The Parties shall interpret and apply the
provisions of this Agreement in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph 1 and in accor-
dance with applicable rules of international law.”  NAFTA art. 1.2(2).
307. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention reads “Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith,” and Article 27 reads “A party may
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This
rule is without prejudice to article 46.”  https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Vol-
ume%201155/ volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf (last visited at March 20, 2016).
308. Marc Andrew Munro, Expropriating Expropriation Law: The Implications of the Metal-
clad Decision on Canadian Expropriation Law and Environmental Land-Use Regulation, 5 AS-
PER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 75, 106-07 (2005).
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ment arbitrations.  Even when the investors invoke such norms, the
tribunals do not often address them whether by dismissing issues on
procedural grounds or failing to deal with the substantive arguments
at all.309  Definitely, there are some concerns about investment tribu-
nals’ attitude towards the area of state environmental regulation.  Out
of such concerns, some states have modified their model treaty lan-
guage for new instruments, concluding subsequent interpretive agree-
ments to the existing instruments, or withdrawing in part or entirely
from the investor-state arbitration system.310
Tribunals have to pay more attention to the legal dimensions of
non-investment issues which cannot be neglected in favor of purely
economic considerations.311  Interpretation rules should be consistent
with the legitimacy of international legal order, which is a challenge,
on and of itself, because it depends on the ability to meld together the
different parts of the international legal order and its development,
including international economic law and international environmental
law.312  However, arbitral tribunals should not use interpretation rules
as a way of favoring the investor interests or other non-investment
interests. Interpretation should be in light of the whole context and
purpose of the treaty itself regardless of whom it serves as affirmed in
Azurix case.313
Should Environmental Measures Be Compensated?
Earlier, we discussed the difference between regulatory taking mea-
sures that are non-compensable and the expropriatory measures that
require compensation.314  Now, we build on this distinction in address-
ing the environmental measures and whether it should result in com-
pensation to a private investor.
Generally, there are three primary rationales for compensating for-
eign investors. First, states should provide a remedy for the investor
when it acquires the latter’s property directly or indirectly.315  Second,
state measures deprive the investor of his investment property be-
cause they are necessary for protecting an essential public interest.
309. Vadi, supra note 39, at 866-67.
310. Marley, supra note 289, at 1015-16.
311. Vadi, supra note 39, at 868-69.
312. Philippe Sands, Searching for Balance: Concluding Remarks, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 198,
203 (2002).
313. Azurix decision, supra note 186, para. 307.
314. See supra Part II(E)(3).
315. This protects against unjust enrichment and ensures that where the public benefit is ob-
tained the burden of obtaining that benefit is borne by the general public.
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Third, expropriation protection preserves states’ contractual commit-
ments and protects investors’ legitimate expectations.316
Environmental provisions that give special consideration to envi-
ronmental regulations would be most appropriate in case where the
environmental regulation is foreseeable and the investor is deprived
of only a portion of his property, or beneficial use of it and there is no
substantial interference with its business or profits.317
In Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States,318 Metalclad, an
incorporated U.S. company,319 purchased COTERIN, a Mexican com-
pany, for acquisition, development and operation of the latter’s haz-
ardous waste transfer station and landfill in Guadalcazar, a Mexican
Municipality.320  COTERIN was granted a “federal permit” to con-
struct the hazardous waste landfill by the National Ecological Institute
(“INE”).321  Metalclad possessed all necessary permits for the landfill
except the federal permit for operating the landfill.322  Metalclad re-
sumed the construction of the landfill due to receiving an eighteen-
month extension of the federal permit.323  Subsequently, the Munici-
pality ordered the cessation of all building activities in the landfill due
to the absence of a municipal construction permit.324  In 1995, the INE
granted Metalclad an additional federal permit for constructing the
final disposition cell for the landfill.325  Metalclad was required to sub-
mit an action plan to correct the deficiencies that were detected by the
environmental audit that checked the project’s compliance with the
laws and regulations.326  Eventually, Metalclad’s application for the
municipal construction permit was denied,327 without Metalclad being
invited to discuss the application. Metalclad’s request for reconsidera-
tion of the permit denial was rejected.328  Metalclad initiated arbitra-
tion against Mexico alleging that Mexican’s local government
interfered with its development and operation of a hazardous waste
316. KAHN ET AL., supra note 48, at 447.
317. Gantz, supra note 89, at 750.
318. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1)
(2000), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&docId=DC542_En&caseId=C155.
319. Id.  It owns wholly Eco-Metalclad Corporation.  Eco-Metlaclad owns 100% of shares of
ECONSA.
320. Metalclad decision, supra note 318, para. 2.
321. Id. para. 28, 29.
322. Id. para. 33.
323. Id. para. 38.
324. Id. para. 40.
325. Id. para. 43.
326. Metalclad decision, supra note 318, para. 48.
327. Id. para. 50.
328. Id. para. 54.
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landfill, thereby violating Chapter 11 of NAFTA; Article 1105 (FET),
Article 1110 (Expropriation).329  In deciding the expropriation claim,
the tribunal held that:
expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or for-
mal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host state, but also
covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has
the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of
the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property
even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State . . .
these measures [denial of permit without basis, municipality acting
outside its authority, subsequent judicial and administrative actions,
regarding Convenio], taken together with the representations of the
Mexican federal government, on which Metalclad relied, and the
absence of a timely, orderly or substantive basis for the denial by
the Municipality of the local construction permit, amount to an indi-
rect expropriation.330
This broad definition of expropriation331 led the tribunal to consider
that Mexico, by its ultra vires unlawful actions of the municipality, un-
dermined Metalclad’s right to operate the landfill.332  This reasoning
was criticized as being an “expansive reading of indirect expropria-
tion.”333  On another note, the tribunal declined to consider the mo-
tive or intent for adopting the Ecological Decree (the environmental
measure) and considered its implementation would, in itself, consti-
tute an act tantamount to expropriation.334  The award is of essence
due to the broad interpretation it gave to expropriation which in-
cludes “covert or incidental interference with the use of property
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant
part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State.”335
It is apparent that in Metalclad, the tribunal neglected the policy
rationale for issuing the measure and concerned only about the regu-
latory interference with the private property rights of the investors,
which necessitates compensation on the basis that the state parties
329. Id. para. 1.
330. Id. para. 103-104, 107.
331. Justice Tysoe noted that the tribunal gave an “extremely broad definition” of expropria-
tion and is “sufficient to include a legitimate rezoning of property by a municipality or other
zoning authority.” See Munro, supra note 308, at 111-12.
332. Munro, supra note 308, at 108-09.
333. Wang, supra note 5, at 269.
334. Metalclad decision, supra note 319, para. 111.
335. Sands, supra note 312, at 198-99.
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agreed on higher standard of property protection more than those af-
forded in customary international law.336
Generally, wherever there might be inconsistency between invest-
ment and non-investment obligations, it is understood that the host
state may adopt the most consistent actions with its international in-
vestment obligations to generate minimum harm to foreign inves-
tors.337  As discussed earlier, certain types of measures that may affect
foreign property will be considered an expropriation and require com-
pensation even though the owner retains the formal title as long as
they interfere with the utility of the investment.338
Although some authors view environmental regulations as tanta-
mount to taking property,339 others view them as non-compensable
takings because they are essential to the efficient functioning of the
state.340
However, compensating the foreign investors due to environmental
measures might collide with the “polluter pays” principle.341  When a
state interferes to protect the environment from the harmful activity
of the investor, it protects the society as a whole against an individ-
ual’s harmful conduct.  Accordingly, when the state pays compensa-
tion to the investor due to the impact of the measure upon his
investment, it pays this compensation in the name of the society as a
whole342 and “the public at large” bears the burden of these legisla-
tions – is directly at odds with the polluter pays principle.343  In other
words, it is argued if the community, represented by the government,
pays the polluters to stop or modify their behavior, it means that pol-
luters own the environment and use it with impunity.344  For these rea-
336. Munro, supra note 308, at 84-85.
337. Moshe Hirsch, Interactions between Investment and Non-investment Obligations, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, at 166 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico
Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).
338. The surrounding circumstances- such as epidemic infections or diseases- may prompt the
authority to confiscate the property by destroying.  For example, in 1894 the Brazilian authori-
ties destroyed lots of watermelons due to an outbreak of cholera.  This measure was justified in
the circumstances and no compensation was paid to watermelon producers. See KAHN ET AL.,
supra note 48, at 424-25.
339. Boyle, supra note 18, at 141.
340. Wagner, supra note 41, at 517-18.
341. This principle was discussed supra, at Part I(B)(3).
342. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that the “determination that governmental action
constitutes a taking, is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single
owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest,” and we recog-
nized that this question “necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests.”  Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1246, 94 L. Ed.
2d 472 (1987).
343. Wagner, supra note 41, at 471.
344. Munro, supra note 308, at 96-97.
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sons, some authors criticized the Metalclad decision because it
arguably transformed the well-established environmental principle of
“polluter pays” into “pay the polluter.”345 Requiring compensation
for the economic impact of environmental regulations conflicts with
the treaty provisions that obligate states to preserve the sound envi-
ronmental framework for the investment, which means it will be costly
for governments to enforce or strengthen existing environmental mea-
sures or to adopt new ones.346
According to one author, the right of the state to adopt appropriate
regulatory measures is undermined if these measures are treated as
tantamount to expropriation.347  In other words, environmental regu-
lations should be considered legitimate regulations that do not nor-
mally give rise to an obligation to compensate in analogous to other
governmental regulations.348  Environmental regulations are of the
same level of importance to be legitimate as those governmental regu-
lations.  This approach is consistent with the polluter pays principle to
make governments free to implement environmental regulations with-
out having to pay to do so.349
Generally, arbitral tribunals look at the investment duration, the
effect of expropriatory measure, the substantial deprivation of the in-
vestor, whether the investor remains control over the investment as-
sets, and investor’s legitimate expectations.  Practically, each tribunal
tries to strike a balance between the conflicting interests, investor’s
rights of protection, and the host state’s right to protect the public
interests i.e., environmental protection.350
A number of approaches were introduced in addressing the envi-
ronmental measures to be considered lawful regulatory takings.  First,
to follow the reasoning of Metalclad i.e., adopting a broad definition
of expropriation, by which states would be forced to take into their
account the economic consequences of their actions.  Second, consid-
ering expropriation rules as an insurance scheme, when the invest-
ment fails, the state becomes an insurer of last resort.  Third, the rules
345. Id.
346. Wagner, supra note 41, at 529.
347. Subedi, supra note 76, at 127.
348. Such as tax regulations, regulations governing the transfer and exchange of currency, and
licensing fees for the production of alcoholic beverages.  See Wagner, supra note 41, at 528.
349. Id. at 528-29.
350. Footer, supra note 8, at 41-42. The Tribunal in Glamis noted “the tension . . . between
private rights in property and the need of the State to regulate the use of property.”  http://italaw
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf.
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should promote the fairness relationship between a foreign investor
and the state.351
Furthermore, in measuring the legitimacy of the measure, caution
should be addressed to the scientific evidence as it might undermine
the precautionary principle that “science does not always provide the
information or insights necessary to take protective action effectively
or in a timely manner, and that undesirable and potentially irreversi-
ble effects may result if action is not taken until science does provide
such insights.”352  Accordingly, the argument goes for the states to
have the right to regulate their environmental measures even if they
are inconsistent with scientific evidences.  The precautionary principle
does not undermine scientific researches or evidences but it does re-
flect the fact that scientific certainty is rare.353
That is why some authors opined that tribunals considering whether
environmental measures are expropriatory measures should limit their
inquiry to legitimate scientific methods and procedures of the evi-
dence derived from, and is probative of a potential for adverse ef-
fects,354 not motivated by a political sham.355  Once the evidence is
proved to be scientific and probative, the tribunal should accept the
legitimate environmental basis for the measure.356  However, it may
be pointed out that there is no right-wrong answer in the scientific
researches and every opinion has its scientific rationality, which might
be reflected on the inconsistency of the environmental regulations.
Therefore, basing the measures on scientific research makes the gov-
ernment unable to face the new environmental challenges because the
scientific researchers have not covered them yet.  Furthermore, objec-
tive scientific evidence that supports issuing the measures would not
exempt the host state from compensating the investor where it is com-
mitted contractually towards him.357
Most of the arbitral decisions buck the opposite approach of strik-
ing a balance between environmental and other objectives as they did
not indicate any particular sensitivity of the arbitrators to environ-
mental considerations.358
351. See Sands, supra note 312, at 204.
352. Wagner, supra note 41, at 532-33.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 534-35.
355. Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 294, at 33.
356. Wagner, supra note 41, at 534-35.
357. Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 294, at 33.
358. Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the Progressive
Development of International Environmental Law (Global Forum on International Investment
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It has been suggested that where the measure is reasonable and
nondiscriminatory, including those related to environmental protec-
tion, it should not be compensable even if it reduced the investment
profits, but the unfair or inequitable measures that discriminate
against foreign investors should be compensable even if they are justi-
fied under the environmental protection grounds.359
However, compensation may be provided to foreign investors as
long as they are deprived of the expected utility of their investment
because this undermines the stable framework within which the inves-
tors work. States are not deprived of their right to regulate in the pub-
lic interest, including regulating the environment, with the obligation
to compensate investors as long as they have no role in causing the
environmental harm. In case the investors cause the environmental
harm, they should not be compensated to the extent they contribute
to this harm.  Furthermore, the host state should expect the extent of
investor’s activities over its environment and bear this in mind in its
negotiation with the investor. Once the host state deviates from its
contractual obligations towards the foreign investors even to secure
non-contractual obligations, it is required to compensate the investors
for any loss resulting thereof.
CONCERNS ABOUT INVESTMENT-ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES
There are a number of international bodies that are concerned with
different categories of disputes.  States adopt selective approaches to
international dispute settlements before these international bodies,
and environmental disputes have no exception.  Due to the absence of
international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies for environmental dis-
putes solely, environmental disputes are sprinkled before different
bodies such as ICJ, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(“ITLOS”), World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the European
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
judicial bodies of regional economic integration organizations (such as
the ECJ), inspection panels, international and transnational arbitral
tribunals.360
Frequently, there is a growing increase in the disputes that involve
international environmental agreements.  Although there is no uni-
form provision for the dispute resolution process because treaties are
negotiated individually between its parties, there are some common
2008), at 10, http://www.oecd. org/investment/globalforum/40311090.pdf (last visited March 20,
2016).
359. Gantz, supra note 127, at 10648-49.
360. Romano, supra note 6, at 1054-55; Boyle, supra note 18, at 143.
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patterns that may be found in many treaties, such as the two-tiered
dispute resolution process, starting by non-binding dispute resolution
such as a recourse to diplomatic means for peaceful settlement,361 lo-
cal litigation in host states, and/or waiting few months after submitting
a dispute notice to “cool off” prior to resorting to arbitration. Binding
arbitration may be involved as a dispute settlement method with req-
uisite preconditions.362
The disputes between foreign investors and the host states often
arise out of IIAs which contain an arbitration clause that invokes the
ICSID, UNCITRAL or other arbitration rules in case one of their
provisions is breached.  A number of standards of treatment are incor-
porated in IIAs.363  These standards constitute the basis for investors’
claims even for the ones relate to the environmental measures.  2013
has witnessed the second largest number of investment arbitration
filed in one year i.e., 56 new cases to reach totally 568.  Investors
brought high number of claims against developed states, challenging a
number of measures, particularly in renewable energy sector.364
There are a number of cases that display the interplay between the
environmental measures and the investment and how the first impacts
and interferes with the latter.365  It should be mentioned that there are
other cases that involved environmental concerns but otherwise not
decided by tribunals whether because they were rejected in the juris-
dictional phase, or the parties withdrew the proceedings.366  Some of
361. Romano, supra note 6, at 1040.
362. Franck, supra note 154, at 11.
363. These standards were discussed in supra Part II.
364. World Investment Report 2014, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 15 (Jun. 24, 2014) (statement by James Zhan, Director of Division on Investment and
Enterprise, UNCTAD), http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/diae_stat_2014-06-24_WIR14_
en.pdf.
365. Such as Parkerings–Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8
(2007). See, Christiane Gerstetter and Nils Meyer-Ohlendorf, Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Under TTIP – A Risk for Environmental Regulation?, THE ECOLOGIC INSTITUTE 11 (Dec. 31,
2013).
366. These cases include Marion Unglaube v. Costa Rica,which was registered with the ICSID
in January 2008, involving an investor who was denied permits needed to develop a beachfront
tourist project because of a legislative decree declaring an area of the beach a preserve for en-
dangered leatherback turtles. See Marion Unglaube v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1
(2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1052.pdf (last visited March
20, 2016).  Another ICSID case, Vattenfall AB, et al. v. Germany which was registered in April
2009 and then suspended in August 2010 pursuant to a settlement agreement, involved claims
brought under the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”) relating to purportedly onerous environmen-
tal restrictions imposed on a coal-fired power plant.  This case was settled by the parties and the
settlement was recorded in the form of an award as per parties’ request. See Vattenfall AB v.
Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6 (2011), https://icsid.worldbank. org/
apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/09/6&tab=PRO (last visited Feb.
14, 2016). See also Philip Morris v. Uruguay, an ICSID case registered in March 2010, involves
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these cases do not have any record beyond the filing of a Notice of
Intent.367  On a counting basis, more than half of the arbitration
claims filed by the end of 2000 involved environmental issues.368  No-
tably, there is an unexpectedly use of the arbitral process to challenge
the public measures, especially environmental ones.  However, these
challenges are unsuccessful in most of the cases.
However, investment-environment disputes raise some concerns re-
garding the powers of the tribunals in displacing the public tribunals in
reviewing the environmental regulations; arbitrators’ expertise; arbi-
trators’ bias; the insufficient standards for decision-making; and the
lack of transparency and public participation in the arbitration
process.
Concerns about Arbitrators Displacing Public Tribunals
in Reviewing Regulations
IIAs grant investors the ability to challenge the host state’s legiti-
mate measures directly before an international investment tribunal to
issue a final and binding award without any review based on merits.
On the other hand, states, by adopting arbitration as a method to re-
solve the disputes, grant arbitrators significant powers to review regu-
latory measures that involve domestic public interest issues.369
Arbitration as a dispute settlement method was, primarily, designed
to govern private commercial disputes that involve only private par-
ties.370  Investor-state arbitration differs from commercial arbitration
claims relating to legislation which, amongst other things, precludes multiple product lines (e.g.,
“regular,” “light,” “menthol”) and requires cigarette packages to be covered by graphic images
of the detrimental health effects of smoking. See Philip Morris Brands Sarl, Philip Morris Prod-
ucts S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/
7) (2013), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&docId=DC3592_En&caseId=C1000 (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
367. Two such cases—claims by Sunbelt and by Ketcham against Canada - were initiated in
1998 and 2000 respectively and appear to have been abandoned by the claimants.  One other -
Texas Water Claims (a claim by farmers in Texas against Mexico concerning alleged diversion of
water) - was filed in 2004 but has not proceeded beyond a notice of intent. See Sanford E.
Gaines, Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter
11, THIRD NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF
TRADE 7 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www3.cec.org/islandora/en/item/2229-environmental-
policyimplications-investor-state-arbitration-under-nafta-chapter-11-en.pdf.
368. Gaines, supra at note 367, at 1. See IIA Issues Note: Recent Developments in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
2 (May 2013), http://unctad. org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf.
369. Such dangerous power over the national measures issued by states led some scholars to
characterize investment arbitration as part of the evolving concept of global administrative law.
See Choudhury, supra note 1, at 778.
370. NIGEL BLACKABY AND CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION 1, 1 (Oxford Univ. Press, 5th ed. 2009).
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in two points.  First, the state should be involved with its capacity as a
public law party not a private party.371  The second is the nature of the
transactions themselves which often involve long-term investments.
The prima facie question is whether the tribunals appropriately and
legitimately have the right to review the state environmental regula-
tions.  We urge that the tribunals do not decide the validity of the
environmental measures issued by the host states as they do not have
the authority nor the capacity to invalidate these measures, otherwise,
they assess the legitimacy of these measures in light of their economic
consequences over the foreign investments.
The power of the tribunals to have jurisdiction over the environ-
mental measures should not be eliminated.  On one hand, these mea-
sures might have, in any way, an effect on foreign investment.  On the
other hand, states may use them as a pretext to interfere in the opera-
tion of the foreign investments through expropriation without any ju-
dicial review over such interference except of the judicial system of
the state itself which most probably would be biased.  Nevertheless,
the tribunals’ review of such measures should be adjusted to the man-
ner in which they can do so taking into account their relative lack of
expertise in the environmental field, and their position as suprana-
tional adjudicators charged with reviewing a state’s regulatory
policy.372
Concerns about Arbitrators Expertise
Although courts have recognized generally the importance of pre-
serving the natural heritage,373 investment tribunals primarily pay
more attention to business consideration more than environmental
concerns.374  Such inclination to subordinate the environmental policy
to the investment and trade policies is manifested in Principle 16 of
the Rio Declaration which specified that the application of the pol-
luter-pays principle should be done without distorting international
371. States deal with parties in two capacities either as a private or a public party.  As a
private party, it does not differ from the other party contracting with it, such as sale agreement.
Unlikely, when it acts as a public party, there would be inequality between the parties due to its
exorbitant powers and public policy authority.
372. Choudhury, supra note 1, at 826.
373. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Scarborough v. R.E.F. Homes Ltd. referred to municipal
government as a “trustee of the environment.” See Munro, supra note 308, at 114-15.  In
Spraytech, the SCC emphasized that Qu. . .bec environmental legislation is concerned not only
with safeguarding the environment of today, but it is also concerned with “evidence of an emerg-
ing sense of inter-generational solidarity and acknowledgment of an environmental debt to hu-
manity and the world of tomorrow. See, Katia Opalka and Joanna Myszka, Sustainability and the
Courts: A Snapshot of Canada in 2009, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 59, 62 (2009).
374. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1349.
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trade and investment.375  Arbitral tribunals have the authority to dis-
tinguish between environmental measures that are issued for environ-
mental purposes or for other politically motivated purposes and so
distinguish between legitimate measures and arbitrary, discriminatory
or expropriatory measures.  Nevertheless, it is not an easy task due to
the absence of clear guidance whether through IIAs or customary in-
ternational law.376
There are some mechanisms that are used by the arbitral tribunals
in evaluating the legitimacy of the environmental measures.  First, ar-
bitral tribunals may seek an expertise opinion, whether party-ap-
pointed experts or tribunal-appointed experts to assess the validity of
the scientific evidences submitted to support the environmental mea-
sures.  Experts may appear before the tribunal as witnesses.  Further-
more, cautious should be paid to the different evaluations of expert
opinions, in addition to the fact that many expert statements may be
submitted to the tribunals that include different, or conflicting, evalua-
tions.  Tribunals often rely on expert statements in technical issues.
Methanex is the standing case in this regard in which the tribunal de-
voted much attention to the scientific evaluations.377  Nevertheless,
the expert statements seem not to be sufficient for the tribunals to
assess the legitimacy of the environmental measures.  Tribunals should
take the scientific evidence as one element in evaluating the legiti-
macy of the measures beside other elements such as its discriminatory
effect and its purpose.  In the meantime, tribunals’ members should
not blindly follow the expert opinions as they are merely evidences
that are submitted to the tribunals, which should be subject to the
tribunal’s tenet on the whole case.
Such insufficiency of expert statements led some commentators to
suggest another mechanism by which the tribunals exercise the role of
judicial review body to use “deferential standards of review” in assess-
ing the state’s endangerment finding.378  This mechanism helps in de-
termining whether the tribunal will be ‘interventionist’ or ‘deferential’
in assessing the state’s action.379  However, this idea is controversial
especially in relation to what the appropriate standard to be applied is
and how to find it.  To overcome such a problem, some commentators
suggested another approach by using various forms of procedural def-
375. Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable Develop-
ment: A Critical Assessment of the Unced Process, 15 J.L. & COM. 623, 632-33 (1996).
376. Gantz, supra note 89, at 655-56.
377. Marley, supra note 289, at 1022; Vadi, supra note 39, at 197-98.
378. Marley, supra note 289, at 1024-25.
379. Id.
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erence to safeguard the possibility of the state taking advantage of
substantive deference to act in bad faith.380  As long as the investors
legitimately are concerned about the illegitimate motives behind the
environmental measures, the procedural deference may be used as a
proxy for expertise-based decision-making.381
Concerns about Arbitrators Bias
In addition to the traditional criticism of the interference in the
states’ powers by the investment tribunals that is unacceptable and
undermines the legitimacy of the investment tribunals themselves, and
the regime as a whole,382 tribunals of investment-environment dis-
putes were criticized of being biased towards the investment laws due
to paying a little consideration to the complex environmental issues
which would result in an inherent bias favoring the investment law
over the environmental principles.
Moreover, the uncertainties that surround the investment regime
might exacerbate such bias.  These uncertainties include the method
of constituting the investment tribunals and choosing the members of
the tribunal, basically the ad hoc tribunals that decide only the cases
before them, and are not formally obliged by precedents, which may
lead to inconsistencies in the tribunals’ approaches.  Such inconsisten-
cies extend to states that may be dissuaded from enacting the environ-
mental measures out of the fear of being held liable.383
As a preliminary observation, the arbitral tribunals still deal with
the investment-environment disputes on the basis that protecting the
investment is the general rule while protecting the environment is just
an exception to this general rule.  Even in the cases where the tribu-
nals held the liability of the state based on environmental measures,
these cases did not introduce any solutions to the tension between the
two conflicting interests, otherwise, they held the host state responsi-
ble to pay compensation for the investor.  They did not introduce any
mechanisms to protect the environment from the harmful investment
activities nor to protect the investment from the disguising environ-
mental measures.
It has been suggested that the following areas need to be paid more
attention in balancing the relationship between investment and envi-
ronmental disputes, including (1) the lack of specific provisions for the
protection of health and safety; (2) the lack of a clear derogating rule
380. Id. at 1030.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 1015.
383. Id. at 1013.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB201.txt unknown Seq: 56 26-MAY-16 14:10
188 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:133
for conflicts between environmental health and safety laws on the one
hand and investment agreements on the other; (3) the legitimacy of an
investment tribunal passing judgment on the validity of scientific evi-
dence relied upon by a legislature; and, (4) the appropriateness of an
investment tribunal reviewing a court decision.384
Insufficient Standards for Decision-making
In attracting FDI to advance their economy, developing countries
sometimes lower their environmental standards to increase their loca-
tional advantages to MNEs whether on their own initiative or by sug-
gestion from MNEs themselves.  The same effect applies to the non-
application or lax implementation of such environmental regulations
out of their impact on their locational advantages to MNEs.  Powerful
investors may constitute a chilling effect on the government powers to
regulate in the public interest.385  This chilling-effect leads to environ-
mental standards relaxation in order to attract FDI.386
As the unanticipated fluctuation in environmental standards in-
creases the risk of reducing the attractiveness of investment,387 MNEs
are prompted to improve their corporate environmental standards, so
as to cope with the environmental regulatory changes in the future.388
Furthermore, they can engage the host state in negotiating the envi-
ronmental regulations before concluding the agreement.389
Due to their sovereignty, states clearly are free to choose relatively
lower environmental standards than other states, which in turn could
encourage foreign investors to pay little attention to local populations,
with little or no local participation in the decision, nor local benefits
from jobs or profits.  That is why NGOs call for minimum national
environmental standards as a prerequisite for open trade and
investment.390
However, the problem of harmonizing both interests is the standard
of review. Environment and investment operate at different levels of
ambiguity.391  This ambiguity favors investors as investment principles
384. Hill, supra note 130, at 167-68.
385. Vadi, supra note 39, at 831-32.  For example, in 2002, some foreign investors threatened
Indonesia to initiate arbitration in response to its ban on open-pit mining in protected forests.
Six months later, the Ministry of Forestry agreed to change the forest designation from protected
to production forests. Id.
386. UNCTAD, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 8-9.
387. Martin, supra note 31, at 256-57.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 257-58.
390. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1343-44.
391. Lilley, supra note 182, at 743-44.
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and rules are relatively clearer than the environmental ones, at least
for the tribunals’ members who decide the cases involving such con-
flicts.  The second problem is the scientific uncertainty that affect en-
vironmental issues.392  It should be mentioned that arbitral decisions
that assess the legitimacy of environmental impact assessment often
reach the same conclusions analogous to parallel jurisprudence of
ICJ.393
The Metalclad decision is a distinctive decision because it was the
first instance to hold a government liable for damages.394  This deci-
sion was clear in holding an environmental measure, ecological de-
cree, as an expropriatory measure.  In scrutinizing this decision, it
could be said that the tribunal weighed the investor’s rights over the
environmental protection concerns.  As a result, this decision raised
various reactions in both environmentalists and public groups that
were concerned with the chilling effect of such decision, and other
similar decisions, on future lawmaking.  On one hand, this decision
would eventually affect the governments’ capability to enact environ-
mental measures due to the fear of potential liability.  On the other
hand, governments might need to conduct a cost analysis before con-
templating the enactment of environmental regulations.395  Further-
more, this decision was criticized as an abuse of Chapter 11’s of
NAFTA in a manner not intended by its parties.396  Such decision
deemed to crystalize a trend of using Chapter 11 as a tool of favoring
MNE’s potential profits over the existing legitimate exercise of sover-
eignty by governments and denying the public its uninhibited right to
sound environment.397
More importantly, the Metalclad decision shows that the tribunals
are no longer shrinking from interpreting local laws nor from ignoring
their official interpretation and adopting their own interpretations.398
Ignoring the environmental concerns by the tribunal means that it dis-
misses the government’s interests in serving its public policy that un-
derlines its measures.  Notably, the tribunal recognized the local
authorities to exercise the police powers for the purpose of protecting
392. Id.
393. Vadi, supra note 39, at 202.
394. Metalclad decision, supra note 318.
395. Byrnes, supra note 274, at 103.
396. Lucien J. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment: The
Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 209, 213
(2001).
397. Id.
398. Dhooge, supra note 396, at 260.
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the health, which covers the environmental measures.399 However, ex-
ercising such police powers exception should be based on a legitimate
substantial interest, which should be subject to reasonable standards.
These standards assume that the environmental risk sought to be pro-
tected by the measure is real and substantial which may be proved by
scientific evidence.  Accordingly, the camouflaged environmental
measures that in fact serve other illegitimate purposes would be
eliminated.
One of the drastic consequences of the Metalclad decision is the
regulatory gridlock that may be incapable of coping with environmen-
tal emergencies as well as scientific advances in an adequate man-
ner.400  It might be seen also as a way of thwarting environmental
measures that would not be able to be thwarted domestically.401  In
addition, this extreme trend of expropriation claims may be used by
the foreign investors as a tool to extract huge settlements from host
states under expansive expropriation claims based on environmental
measures.402
Furthermore, issuing environmental measures should involve due
process.  However, Metlaclad procedures were convicted as undemo-
cratic due to their secrecy and violating due process.403  This decision
shows the significance of enhancing the due process and transparency
in investment-environment disputes.
Lack of Transparency; Third Party Participation
Transparency plays an important role in investment-environment
disputes. Transparency refers to the extent by which the public should
be aware, or even participate, in a proceeding where public interests
are at stake.  How governments use transparency to enhance their
public interests, how tribunals deal with transparency alongside the
proceedings and to what extent transparency may affect the due pro-
cess?  These questions, and those developed over our discussion, re-
present a core part in investor-state dispute which would contribute to
enhancing the legitimacy of the mechanism itself.
Investment arbitration has been criticized by the OECD as a non-
transparent and inefficient process due to the restrictions of public-
399. Id. at 263.
400. Id. at 273-74.
401. Id. at 276-77.
402. Lauren E. Godshall, In the Cold Shadow of Metalclad: The Potential for Change to
Nafta’s Chapter Eleven, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 264, 314-15 (2002).
403. Dhooge, supra note 396, at 213.
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disclosure.404  Tribunals should assess the legitimacy of the process
that led to the challenged measure.  In Waste Management v. Mexico,
the tribunal referred to the minimum standard being breached where
there is a complete lack of transparency and candor in an administra-
tive process.405  The lack of public transparency in the arbitral process
obscures the process itself. There is no formal way of announcing the
claims and once the tribunal is duly constituted, the process becomes
confidential, the hearings take place behind the doors, similar to pri-
vate commercial disputes,406 and no requirement for publishing the
decisions.  That is why environmentalists view investor-state as frus-
trating the goals of sustainable development.407
A core related question is to what extent MNEs are responsible for
increasing their transparency in their environmental affairs?  Nor-
mally, governments of developed nations use their coercive powers to
increase MNEs’ transparency in relation to the environmental affairs
by embracing dispositions favoring global environmental health over
unregulated investment marketplace,408 which reflects an environ-
mental consciousness in MNEs’ decision making process.409  Further-
more, it would enhance the local enterprises performance that try to
match the environmental standards of the foreign competitors.  Ac-
cordingly, when MNEs behave in an environmentally responsible
framework, the host state elevates its environmental standards to de-
velop a better environmental framework.410  The transparency of the
environmental accountability may be evidenced by the environmental
impact assessment reports.411
States are obliged to respect and protect freedom of expression, in-
cluding the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information.412
Therefore, the lack of transparency in investor-state arbitration may
404. Newcombe, supra note 48, at 431.
405. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3,
Award, ¶ 98 (Apr. 30, 2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34643.pdf.
406. David Schorr, director of WWF’s Sustainable Commerce Program said, “A procedure
designed to settle private commercial disputes is being used to rewrite important public policies
behind closed doors.”  Julia Ferguson, supra note 248, at 514-15.
407. Martin, supra note 31, at 225.
408. Id. at 252.
409. Id. at 250-51.
410. Id. at 252.
411. See id. at 250-51 for a survey on the reports on issues of environmental responsibility.
412. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights places upon states
the duty to respect, protect and fulfill the human right to freedom of expression, which includes
the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kind, regardless of fron-
tiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.” Oct. 5, 1977, 999 T.S. 172, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Vol-
ume %20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf.
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hold the state liable for breaching its human rights’ duty to protect
freedom of expression.413
Although the ICSID Convention and Rules do not protect confi-
dentiality, investment tribunals have recognized the transparency re-
quirement.414  Transparency gives the public an opportunity to
monitor the proceeding and assess its outcome due to the public inter-
ests at stake in these disputes.  Lack of transparency undermines this
possibility and nurtures the belief that awards are unjust and resulted
from procedural biases.415  Therefore, many arbitral proceedings
make available the submitted documents to the public.416  In
Methanex, the tribunal pointed out the public interests at stake and
inclined to accept amicus submissions due to the public concerns in-
volved in the issue.417  This case witnessed a broad application of the
amicus provisions stipulated in ICSID Rules.418  In Metalclad, due to
the absence of transparency requirement in Chapter 11, the tribunal
relied on Article 102(1), which states the objective of NAFTA, to
transplant the transparency requirement.419
Unlike NAFTA,420 CAFTA requires the hearings to be opened to
the public and the documents to be made public.421  Nevertheless,
some stakeholders might have an interest to participate in the pro-
ceedings that involve a public interest.  Out of transparent proceed-
413. Bijlmakers, supra note 7, at 262-63.
414. Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 759 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino &
Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008) (“The Convention and the Rules do not prevent the parties from
revealing their case.”).  This view was affirmed in Amco Asia Corporation v. Republic of Indo-
nesia, (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1) Dec. on Request for Provisional Measures, 400, 412 (Dec. 9,
1983) 1 ICSID Rep. 569 (1993) and Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 13 (Aug. 30, 2000), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC542_En&caseId=C155.
415. Bijlmakers, supra note 7, at 265
416. For example, the U.S. made available the related documents in Lowen v. United States
and Canada has provided full public access to documents in the Ethyl v. Canada. Methanex has
posted several documents on its web site.  See, Ferguson, supra note 248, at 506.
417. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Per-
sons to Intervene as Amici Curiae,,¶ 49 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 15, 2001); Delaney &
Barstow, supra note 414, at 760.
418. The Tribunal received two applications for permission to file a non-disputing party sub-
mission: (i) the application for amicus curiae status by International Institute for Sustainable
Development dated 9th March 2004, and (ii) the application of non-disputing parties for leave to
file a written submission by Earth justice on behalf of Bluewater Network, Communities for a
Better Environment and Center for International Environmental Law, also dated 9th March
2004. Id. para 28.
419. Munro, supra note 308, at 106-07.
420. For the differences between NAFTA and CAFTA, see supra Part III(1).
421. Wang, supra note 5, at 275-76.
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ings, those stakeholders may participate in the proceedings through
“amicus submission”.
ICSID Rules provide for amicus submissions in certain situations
and pursuant to the discretionary power of the arbitral tribunal it-
self.422  NAFTA tribunals consider accepting such submission a de
facto practice, such as Metalclad tribunal.  Additionally, tribunals
sometimes invite the public to view the proceedings. For instance,
the Glamis Gold tribunal invited the public to view the proceedings in
a separate room via closed circuit television.423
The opacity that takes place under the cloak of confidentiality con-
stituted an asymmetry of the FDI arbitration procedures and violate
basic guarantees of public access.  From a democratic point of view,
FDI arbitration was considered ill-suited to address complex public
matters.424  The amicus brief is the closely related method to demo-
cratic measures that permit the publication of documents and open
public hearings in investment disputes425 because they often attract
intense public scrutiny.426
Traditionally, investment arbitration, as the commercial arbitration,
was focusing on the privity of the parties and the consensual nature of
the arbitration.  With the growing trend of investment disputes and
the introduction of the public interest concepts at stake, there might
be some non-disputing parties who are affected by these proceedings
and want to show up before the tribunal to present their views about
the dispute in a neutral way.  This state of mind about the public inter-
est concept favored the acceptance of amicus briefs.
However, the issue of amicus curiae was regulated solely by each
arbitral tribunal without any regulatory framework to work through.
The first tribunal to deal with the amicus curiae submission was suez-
Vivendi, by a way of acknowledging the transparency of investment
arbitration.427  This decision sets out three condition for amicus to
participate in the proceedings as follows a) appropriateness of the
subject matter, b) suitability of a non-party to act as amicus curiae,
and c) the procedure by which the amicus submission is made and
considered.428  The first amicus request in regard to environmental
422. ICSID Arb. R. 37(2) (amended 2006).
423. See Vadi, supra note 39, at 879-80.
424. Bijlmakers, supra note 7, at 266.
425. Choudhury, supra note 1, at 814.
426. Id.
427. Delaney & Barstow, supra note 414, at 756-57; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A v. The Argentine Republic award (ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19), http://www.italaw.com/documents/SuezVivendiAWGDecisiononLiability.pdf.
428. Footer, supra note 8, at 51-52.
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concerns was made in the Aguas del Tunari case but eventually it was
rejected.429
Furthermore, the Methanex decision was a significant win for the
environmentalists in which they fought against the lack of trans-
parency in this proceedings in addition to submitting many petitions to
the UNCITRAL body to allow amicus briefs until the tribunal issued
a surprising award that allowed the amicus input.430  Although this
award does not bind UNCITRAL bodies nor other tribunals, it led to
an explicit modification of NAFTA provisions to secure the amicus
participation.431
Furthermore, the use of amicus briefs increased in practice, which
led the World Bank, in 2006, to amend its ICSID Arbitration Rules to
open the door for CSOs to submit their briefs before the investment
tribunals.432  Such development in non-party participation in invest-
ment disputes pushed governments to include similar clauses in their
investment treaties.433  This ensures environmental groups and other
public advocacy organizations that their voices will be heard.434
As long as non-disputing parties such as environmental groups ar-
gue for transparency and nonparty submission rights, equally it can be
argued for business promotion groups who may have an interest in
being heard on the side of aggrieved investors.  The Glamis case is an
important case in this regard as it pointed out the fact that amicus
submissions can be favoring either side.435
The amicus brief is one tool for the tribunals to assess the environ-
mental endangerment of the investment activities.  Amicus briefs al-
low the participation of CSG, such as NGOs, which in turn may
effectively account for the tribunals’ public law role in the cases in-
volving environmental issues.436  Allowing non-disputing party partici-
pation through amicus briefs is beneficial to states especially in regard
429. Id. at 51.
430. Hill, supra note 130, at 165; Marley, supra note 289, at 1020-21; Gaines, supra note 467, at
6.
431. Hill, supra note 130, at 165.
432. The 2003 Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation
under NAFTA has the same rule. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/38791.pdf.
433. Footer, supra note 8, at 34.
434. Byrnes, supra note 274, at 54.
435. Jean E. Kalicki, The Prospects for Amicus Submissions, Outside the ICSID Rules,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sep. 14, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/09/14/the-pros-
pects-for-amicus-submissions-outsi de-the-icsid-rules.
436. Marley, supra note 289, at 1031-32; Choudhury, supra note 1, at 815-16.
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to environmental measures to show the importance of the impugned
measures from an environmental perspective.437
However, the amicus method is subject to a number of criticisms.
First, third parties’ participation in the arbitral proceedings – through
amicus or any other way – would lead to judicialization of the arbitral
proceedings so far which is an avoidable consequence of arbitration as
it would increase the costs and time of the arbitral process itself.  Sec-
ond, according to the party autonomy principle, BIT is the basis for
foreign investor’s claims and non-disputing third parties or stakehold-
ers are not parties to such BIT.  This would collide with the host
state’s legitimate expectation as it legitimately expects who would be
its counter party in the dispute.438  Additionally, host state does not
know the identity of those potential stakeholders nor their numbers.
Third, such potential judicialization of the arbitral process would ulti-
mately re-politicize the investment disputes.439  However, amicus sub-
missions might offer important assertions of fact to which the parties
may feel welcoming such submissions.  Nevertheless, such factual as-
sertions or technical expertise offered by amicus submissions might be
argued to be tested by the parties through cross-examination. Accord-
ingly, the tribunal would evaluate the persuasive value of the argu-
ments not the amici.440  However, these criticisms should not
eliminate the functional rule of amicus as far as calling for regulating
it through sound procedural framework.
PROPOSED REGIMES
The growing trend of investment flows may result in a real threat to
the environmental framework of the host states and at the end, the
environment will pay the price.441  Such a policy will leave no room
for the “polluter pays” principle to operate which will in turn under-
mine the sound environment.  Therefore, all the related parties, in-
cluding investors, governments, and third parties, started to formulate
“green investment strategies” in order to burgeoning the capital flows
in a much sound environmental framework.442
437. Marley, supra note 289, at 1033-34; see also Vadi, supra note 39, at 882-83 (explaining the
importance of amicus briefs for indigenous people in disputes relating to them and referring to
Glamis case).
438. It may be argued that the amicus briefs are submitted from a neutral point of view but in
fact this is a pure theoretical view but in practice the submission favors either side of the dispute.
439. Vadi, supra note 39, at 885.
440. Kalicki, supra note 435.
441. Ferguson, supra note 248, at 516.
442. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1345.
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Although the environmental investment disputes are of essence in
the investment field, there is no refinement to the environmental re-
gimes within the sphere of investment.  The investment regime needs
a mechanism that properly and efficiently addresses these complicated
issues.  Authors vary in their suggestions to these mechanisms be-
tween substantive and procedural mechanisms.  While some sugges-
tions go for adjusting the interpretation of the environmental
provisions in investment treaties, others go for creating an investment
court that controls and functions as a constitutional guardian for
proper application of these regimes.  It is hoped that the following
reflections will serve as a catalyst for discussion and debate among
practitioners in an attempt to contribute to addressing the tensions
between both bodies of the law and policy.
Any treatment of the investment-environment interface is incom-
plete without some consideration of the proposed methods that are
likely to have immeasurable impact on the whole system of the invest-
ment arbitration. In considering our proposed regimes, we begin first
with the substantive proposed regimes that include the enhancement
of the EIA, reviewing the BITs provisions, the Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility (“CSR”), and the rationale of compensation.  Second, we
discuss the procedural proposed regimes that include the creation of
the investment court, the mechanism of counterclaim by states in in-
vestment arbitration, and finally proposing the so called “Reconcilia-
tion Committee”.
First of all, states should regularly review the IIAs to which they are
party to update them in light of the development of the environmental
field and other sustainable resources that may better serve the public
interest.  Such review should be reconciled pursuant to domestic and
international environmental standards and should involve the current
foreign investors whose projects may be affected by such review.
In 2011, the OECD-hosted Freedom of Investment (FOI) discussed
the role of international investment in supporting the green growth
objectives of the countries.443  The OECD urges the governments to
examine:
[W]hether their investment treaty practices are up-to-date with re-
gard to environmental concerns and consider including language in
investment treaties or environmental treaties to provide guidance
about how environmental and investment law goals are to be recon-
ciled . . . Governments should seek to ensure that, where relevant,
443. They came up with a draft statement that links the investment with the environment in
different areas, it may be accessed at http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestment
agreements/46905672.pdf.
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the ISDS system adequately integrates and balances the goals of
international environmental and investment law. To the greatest ex-
tent possible, governments should strive to ensure that the ISDS
system adequately addresses the application of investment law to
environmental measures in a transparent and publicly accountable
manner that allows, where appropriate, participation by interested
third parties. In order to ensure a consistent treatment of this issue,
governments should consider including provisions on transparency
of ISDS in their investment agreements.444
Substantive Proposed Regimes
Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”)
EIA may be used as an instrument to assess the environmental risk
management and ensure that the decision-making process takes the
environmental concerns into account. Simultaneously, EIA enhances
the sound decision making process.445  Each investment activity
should be subject to the EIA in order to evaluate clearly its potential
environmental impacts before making the decision.  Notably, EIA is
required by a number of IIAs.446
Although the EIA is now a common practice in investments involv-
ing environmental issues and growingly recognized by most of the
treaties and considered one of the important environmental tools, its
scope and content is not determined.447  In addition, the parties may
intend to give some treaty provisions a meaning that capable of evolv-
ing over time without having a solid or fixed meaning.  Such terms
should be interpreted in light of the practice and performance of these
obligations.
EIA should be conducted independently alongside the development
of investment agreements.  All the issues being negotiated should be
considered from the point of their impact upon the environment.  A
panel of independent non-stakeholder experts may be constituted to
act as “friends of the Chair” in order to give their advices about the
environmental implications of various proposals.448  This pre-assess-
444. Id. at 5-6.
445. Valentina S. Vadi, Environmental Impact Assessment in Investment Disputes: Method,
Governance and Jurisprudence, 30 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 169, 170 (2010).
446. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Convention on Environ-
mental Impact Assessment in a Trans-boundary Context (Espoo Convention), the 2001 Interna-
tional Law Commission Draft Articles on Prevention of Trans-boundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities, and the UNEP Goals and Principles 21 require EIA require EIA.
447. Pulp Mills (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 25 (Apr. 20) (the International Court of Jus-
tice, in the Pulp Mills Case, observed that “general international law” does not “specify the
scope and content of an environmental impact assessment.”) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/135/15877.pdf.
448. Mann, supra note 249, at 407-08.
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ment process would ensure that the review is timely and prevents the
unintended consequences.  This proposal purports to complement the
goal of investment law to operate in a sound environment.
Substantively, EIA should be based on scientific evidences and re-
flects the effectiveness and candid about uncertain issues in addition
to being well reasoned.  Procedurally, EIA enhances the transparency
of the decision making process by which it involves public participa-
tion and consultation and being accessible to the private stakeholders.
The public should understand the environmental impact of the pro-
posed activities and express their views to the decision makers be-
cause they might be affected by the environmental degradation and
would be exposed to pollution.  Public participation is necessary be-
cause such issues involve matters of public governance and they would
provide the authorities with valuable data that help in decision mak-
ing and on the other hand, it would enhance the legitimacy of the
decision making process.449  Furthermore, arbitral tribunals would pay
much attention to the procedural fairness attached to the EIA, which
in turn can embody the environmental concerns into the economic
interests while respecting both bodies of law.450
BIT Provisions
As discussed earlier, reference to environmental concerns in IIAs
may take different methods,451 whether by ignoring it at all, address-
ing it in general and hortatory provisions, addressing environmental
concerns in specific clauses that affirm the host state’s powers to pro-
tect environment, including the pledge not to lower environmental
standards to attract investment, or finally, incorporating mandatory
obligations to observe certain environmental standards such as envi-
ronmental sound technology and management practice.452
It would be more convenient to directly address the environmental
concerns in a clear cut provisions453 that gives states the self-power to
protect their environment without harming the investor’s property in
light of the agreed upon standards to be negotiated between the state
and the investors in a transparent way.454  This approach would give
449. Vadi, supra note 445, at 179.
450. Id. at 201.
451. See supra Part III(C)(2)(a).
452. UNCTAD-Environment, supra note 4, at 3; see supra Part III(C)(2) (for more details).
453. See CAFTA supra note 283, at 43-44.
454. Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment Law, Belg.-Lux.-
Eth., Oct. 26, 2006, UNCTAD.org available at http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_tobedeleted/ iia/
docs/bits/BLEU-Ethiopie-eng.pdf (a good approach is adopted by Belgium/Luxembourg by
combining the reservation of policy space with a specific definition of environmental laws.  The
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arbitrators clear guidance in striking the balance between environ-
mental regulations and investment protection.  Nevertheless, the
question remains as to the method of interpretation to these environ-
mental provisions?
Interpretation of Environmental Issues
The interpretation of BITs ranges pursuant to the degree on which
emerging customary norms and principles relating to sustainable de-
velopment impact pre-existing treaties.  The role of international in-
vestment in the economic development was recognized in the
preamble of the ICSID Convention.  The question is whether this ref-
erence to economic development should be interpreted in terms of
sustainable development.455
Arbitral tribunals have rarely addressed the non-investment law
principles.456 Nevertheless, arbitrators should deploy the interpreta-
tion tools to the harmonization of the term experience and the com-
mon sense.457  The challenge in itself is how to adjust the
interpretation rules to be consistent with the legitimacy of interna-
tional legal order which requires the melding of different parts of the
international legal order and its development, including international
economic law and international environmental law, by the tribunals’
members.  However, the interpretation rules should be used on an
equal footing for both parties and tribunals should not use them to
favoring the investor interests or other non-investment interests over
another.
provision reads as “Recognising the right of each Contracting Parties recognise to establish its
own levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental development policies and
priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental legislation. Each Contracting
Party shall strive to ensure that its legislation provide for high levels of environmental protection
and shall strive to continue to improve this legislation . . . “environmental legislation” means:
any legislation of the Contracting Parties in force at the date of the signature of this Agreement
or passed after the date thereof or provision of such legislation, the primary purpose of which is
the protection of the environment, or the prevention of a danger to human, animal, or plant life
or health, through: a) the prevention, abatement or control of the release, discharge, or emission
of pollutants or environmental contaminants; b) the control of environmentally hazardous or
toxic chemicals, substances, materials and wastes, and the dissemination of information related
thereto; c) the protection or conservation of wild flora or fauna, including endangered species,
their habitat, and specially protected natural areas in the Contracting Party’s territory.”).
455. Orellana, supra note 48, at 715.
456. Vadi, surpa note 39, at 866-67.
457. See supra Part III(C)(2)(b).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB201.txt unknown Seq: 68 26-MAY-16 14:10
200 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:133
Interpretation Supervisory Body
Due to the inadequacies in organizing the FDI, some developed na-
tions and international institutions are calling for supervisory bodies
to oversee BIT performance.458  This has induced some commentators
to propose attaching concurrent negotiations for environmental condi-
tions to FDI negotiations which would be based on a priority list of
the prevailing environmental ills in each developing nation, ranging
from absent or inadequate environmental standards, to negligent en-
forcement of existing regulations.459  This priority list would focus on
all areas most in need of improvement for each developing nation.460
It has to be applied equally and on a competitive basis with a uniform
and thorough set of rules governing FDI.  This way would strengthen
the bargaining position of the developing states in negotiating foreign
investment agreements.461  As the unanticipated fluctuation in envi-
ronmental standards increases the risk of reducing attractiveness of
investment, MNEs are prompted to improve their corporate environ-
mental standards, so as to cope with the environmental regulatory
changes in the future.462  Furthermore, they can engage the host state
in negotiating environmental regulations before concluding the
agreement.463
Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”)
International corporations and multinational enterprises play an im-
portant role in striking the balance between investment protection
and environmental protection.  This role can be manifested by the
CSR.  The harm that occurs to the environment is attributable to these
corporations as one of their wrong doings.  To what extent these en-
terprises responsible for such wrong doings, which may constitute a
violation of the international human rights obligations on non-govern-
mental entities in the private sphere?
This issue has a deep complexity because the states, not corpora-
tions, are considered, under international law, responsible for securing
the environmental protection and fundamental human rights.  MNE’s
458. See Martin, supra note 31, at 230-31 (the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) is established by the United States to ensure the environmentally sound performance of
its BITs in developing countries).
459. Id. at 238-39.
460. Id. at 240.
461. Id. at 238-39.
462. Id. at 256-57.
463. Id. at 257-58.
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failure to uphold basic economic and social rights will result in a legal
redress against this MNE in national courts of the host state.464
The draft Norwegian Model BIT in Article 32 has referred to CSR
to conduct the investment in compliance with the OECD Guidelines
on MNEs and to participate in United Nations Global Compact.465
The OECD Guidelines assert that MNEs should refrain from seeking
or accepting exemptions from environmental measures that are not
contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework.466 Notably,
some non-OECD countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Slovakia
had already committed themselves to such efforts.467 Although this
draft was withdrawn in 2009 by the Norwegian government, it distrib-
uted an English-language version of its CSR policy, which was the first
step to hardening up some of the soft CSR standards which was reso-
nated in BITs and other forms of IIAs.468
Some authors suggest that the host country acts as an “insurer of
last resort” where it is not possible to sue a private corporation that
causes the harm directly, the country might be held liable under inter-
national law as the harm was originated within its borders.469 This risk
of responsibility may encourage countries to enact precautionary or
preventive measures through enacting legislations to protect its
environment.470
Possibly, states may refer to foreign investor’s corporate social re-
sponsibility as a defense to investor’s claim and to justify its regulatory
reaction for failure to comply with the basic standards of CSR. Never-
theless, arbitral tribunals may construe CSR provisions narrowly or
totally ignore them due to their soft or non-binding language.471
Since 1990, corporations started publishing policies of corporate re-
sponsibility to discuss various issues including environmental ones.
These policies vary from weak policies that include general pledges to
464. Footer, supra note 8, at 58-60 (stating that in 1999, the European Parliament adopted a
code of conduct for European enterprises operating in developing countries to combine interna-
tional minimum standards in matters related to human rights, labour standards and environmen-
tal protection).
465. See Article 32 of the draft Norway Agreement, available at http://investmentpoli-
cyhub.unctad.org/ Download/TreatyFile/2873; see also Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, at 666 (2008).
466. Id at 671-72. The Guidelines may be accessed at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/480043
23.pdf.
467. Footer, supra note 8, at 61-62.
468. Id.
469. Muchlinski, supra note 465, at 669.
470. Id.
471. Footer, supra note 8, at 62-63.
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strong policies that provide for commitment engagement.472  Some
commentators recommend that international investment law should
address the concept of International Corporate Social Responsibility
(“ICSR”), which benefit the investment itself.473  ICSR recognizes the
relationships between business activities and social actors.474 Society
involvement is one way that determines the success in promoting eco-
nomic prosperity and environmental sustainability.475
CSR is an advanced development in the interaction between invest-
ment activities and social interests in general.  The CSR would act as a
transparent framework for the MNEs and the host states. MNEs
would know the extent by which they could perform their activities
and the obligations result thereof.  States in preserving their social in-
terests would know the extent by which their measures would affect
the MNEs.  States on the other hand may rely on the CSR policies in
supporting their enactment of the measures.
The Rationale of Compensation
Environmental measures primarily are not different from any other
measures issued by the state under the cloak of its powers to regulate
its fundamental interests, especially those related to the public inter-
ests, such as the environmental concerns.  The controversy is not
about the state’s powers to issue these measures but the misuse of
such powers to issue these measures for other purposes not related to
the public interests.  Therefore, the focus should be addressed to how
these measures are issued through a proper procedural and substantial
framework that guarantees that the state would not deviate from its
basic purposes of protecting the public interests including the environ-
mental ones.
The presumption is that the environmental measures should be con-
sidered of the state’s police powers unless it has been proved other-
wise by the investor.476  Accordingly, the state has a refutable
presumption that its environmental measures are legitimately justified
and if the investor believes otherwise, he should prove this.
In relation to the compensation, a distinction should be drawn be-
tween the total deprivation of the investment property where the in-
472. Ahmad, supra note 9, at 8.
473. Id. 14-15.
474. Id.
475. Steve Charnovitz, Reflections on North American Environmental Cooperation, 28 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. 489, 494 (2002).
476. See UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION, supra note 125, at 92 (similarly, states under interna-
tional law are presumed to act in good faith unless otherwise is proved, and States’ acts enjoy a
presumption of validity).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB201.txt unknown Seq: 71 26-MAY-16 14:10
2015] INVESTMENT-ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES 203
vestor should receive a “full compensation” including the loss of profit
and the expected gain, not only the fair market of the assets, and the
interference with the investor’s control or the utility of the property
confiscated, the compensation should be based on the fair market be-
cause the investor still enjoys the control over the property even if
such control is restricted or the utility of the property is eliminated by
the measure.
The full compensation is necessary for the total deprivation because
it reflects recklessness from the State to the extent that it did not fore-
see the normal consequences of the investment activities.  The idea of
the full compensation is inspired from the concept of punitive dam-
ages by which the full compensation may exceed the normal damages
in order to punish the state.  On another note, it would be more ap-
propriate to refer to the environmental measures in the IIAs and the
extent by which the state may issue environmental measures. This
would assure the investor’s legitimate expectation.  In addition, it
would constitute the framework within which the state exercises its
authority and it will not be able to proceed this framework except for
exceptional necessity and in all cases, investors should be adequately
compensated for the loss they suffer regardless of the State’s motiva-
tions for such measures. However, these motivations may be a deci-
sive factor in the value of the compensation itself not the basis of it.
Procedural Proposed Regimes
International Investment Court (“IIC”)
Parallel to the ICJ and the different chambers it has to resolve dif-
ferent spectrums of disputes, an International Investment Court
(“IIC”) could be a step in the right path to harmonize the investment
related disputes, including the environmental-investment disputes.
Alternatively, many authors call for creating an appellate body for the
investment disputes that would increase the degree of certainty and
efficiency of the arbitral decisions.477  This appellate review body
would be parallel to the WTO appellate body.478  Many of the arbitral
cases are appealed to the designated court of the seat of arbitration,
such as Metalclad decision.  However, there are some doubts about
the role of the appellate body in regard to its relation to investment
477. Asif H Qureshi, Chapter 28 An Appellate System In International Investment Arbitration,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, at 1167 (Peter Muchlinski,
Frederico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer, eds. 2008).
478. See CAFTA supra note 283, Article 10.20.10 (CAFTA requires negotiations for the es-
tablishment of an appellate body for review of awards); see supra Part III(C)(1)).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB201.txt unknown Seq: 72 26-MAY-16 14:10
204 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:133
and whether it would be more or less friendly to investor interests
than a court of the situs country.479
Nevertheless, the IIC is superior to the concept of an appellate
body as it encompasses the whole disputes related to investment of
whatever nature.  The IIC would have a constitutional function in the
investment field and would act as a guardian of the fundamental prin-
ciples upon which the investment regime is based in addition to the
development dimensions.480  The IIC would be the principal adjudica-
tory body for the investment disputes and facilitate the tensions be-
tween different investment regimes and the application of general
international law, including environmental law, in the investment
sphere.481 It would consider the relevant environmental issues on
equal footing with the investment issues which precludes the auto-
matic superiority of the investment issues over environmental issues
by the tribunals that deals with such disputes from the perspective of
investment rules not environmental ones.
In conclusion, the IIC could perform a fundamental, overarching,
and above all constitutional role in international investment relations
this constitutional role is particularly evident in its guardianship of
fundamental principles and procedures, in its function in the develop-
ment of international investment norms, and in its advisory and con-
flict-resolving role for and between different legal regimes.482
Counter Claims in Investment Arbitration
Part of the natural justice that afford both parties to the same dis-
pute an equal opportunity to present their cases, investment treaties
should allow the host states to file counter claims against foreign in-
vestors to make a procedural balance of the competing or conflicting
interests.  States have the right to defend its environmental framework
against harmful practices of investors and claim for compensation
thereof. Indeed, some recent investment treaties specifically allow
counterclaims against investors who initiate the investor-state pro-
cess.483  Host states may file the counterclaim for its own or on behalf
of its citizens who suffered some harm from the foreign investment
activities.484
479. Wang, supra note 5, at 277.
480. Qureshi, supra note 477, at 1166.
481. Id. at 1167.
482. Id.
483. Vadi, supra note 39, at 884-85.
484. Id.
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Practically, the investment tribunals do dismiss counter claims filed
by the host states, allowing only foreign investors to file claims against
the host states, which appear only as Respondents not Claimants.
Furthermore, the system of investment arbitration is used as sword for
the foreign investors and as a shield for the host states.  If the host
state decides to sue the foreign investors for the harmful practices
over the environment, it has to follow a different way of justice other
than arbitration. This was the practice of investment tribunals until
2012.
In 2012, an unprecedented award was issued that affirmed the juris-
diction of the tribunal over the State’s Counterclaim. This was the first
decision in IIA arbitration of its kind. In Goetz,485 Burundi sought
US$ 1 million from the claimants for their bank’s failure to honour the
terms of a local operating certificate. Although the applicable BIT was
silent on the issue of counterclaim, the tribunal decided that it was
competent to consider the counterclaim pursuant to Article 46 of the
ICSID Convention as the counterclaim fell within the jurisdiction of
ICSID (i.e., related to the investment).  Having admitted the counter-
claim, the tribunal went on to dismiss it on the merits.486
This procedural development in the investment arbitration would
be a great step of balancing the conflicting interests.  According to this
unprecedented step, the presumption that States may issue environ-
mental measures tainted by other illegitimate purposes would be re-
futed by this procedural guarantee for the state itself.  Tribunals would
be able to balance the situation from both equivalent perspectives.
Nevertheless, this view would face some practical obstacles in its
application because most of the investment tribunals are reluctant to
accept States to appear as Claimant in Counterclaims.  In addition, the
precedents system does not apply in arbitration and hence, the subse-
quent tribunals are not obliged to follow the Goetz tribunal.  Notably,
the Goetz decision was issued by a tribunal’s members of civil law
background who are more lenient to accepting the counter claims.487
Most of the other cases that rejected the filing of the counterclaim
were consisting of common law arbitrators. This might shed a light on
the way of constituting the tribunals which is a strategic decision.  The
485. Goetz v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2, Sentence, ¶ 127 (June 21,
2012), https://icsid.worldbankorg/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC2651_Fr&caseId=C2.
486. Id.
487. The tribunals’ members were Gilbert Guillaume (French), Jean-Denis Bredin (French),
and Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri (Egyptian).
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fact that this was the only precedent accepting counter claims and
whether the tribunals would follow it or not is an important question.
Some commentators go further step of assessing the environmental
impact of the investment treaties themselves in order to avoid the po-
tential inconsistency between states’ obligations488 and would reshape
the investment provisions in compatibility with the environmental
protection.489  Such proposal may require using an independent envi-
ronmental expertise in all committees with environmental dimensions.
It is important that the decision makers should be aware of the rela-
tionships between environmental management processes of the trade
agreements at the preliminary stages of negotiating these agreements
in addition to the implementation stage and thus there should be some
sort of balance between trade, development, and environmental
dimensions.490
Reconciliation Committee
We would recommend creating a preliminary committee acting as a
reconciliatory panel.491  This committee should include representa-
tives from members of both States, the host State and the State of
investor’s nationality, including legal and environmental experts to de-
cide whether there is a taking that tantamount to an expropriation.
The major difference between this committee and the EIA process
is that the latter is made before concluding the agreement between the
investors and the host states as a way of predicting the impact of the
investment on the environment, whereas the committee functions only
after the dispute is raised between the investor and the host state in
trying to evaluate the legitimacy of the state’s interference with the
investment utility.  In addition, the EIA does not require a specific
way to be made except as to be an independent one, whereas the com-
mittee is constituted by members from both states including legal and
environmental experts.  Furthermore, there should be a time limit for
the committee to finalize its opinion and this time limit should not be
long in order not to prejudice the proceedings and both parties’ rights.
The committee should have 30 (thirty) days to finalize its opinion.
488. Vadi, supra note 445, at 203.
489. Id.
490. Mann, supra note 249, at 409.
491. The idea of this committee comes from the two tier clauses by which the parties can’t
resort to arbitration without fulfilling some procedural requirements.  Basically, it is similar to
the clauses in construction disputes that refer first to the engineer as an expert.  The same ap-
plies to environmental issues but with a broader sense by which the committee does not include
only environmentalists but legal, investment, and environmentalist representatives from both
states.
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The requirement of the committee’s opinion should be used as a
“fork in the road” clause which should be incorporated in the BITs to
find its basis in the statutory provisions.  Accordingly, any dispute in-
volving an environmental measure should be first referred to an inde-
pendent committee before resorting to arbitration to file a claim.
However, the constitution of this committee should be consensual be-
tween the host state and the investor on a condition that it should
include members of both States.  This would facilitate the mission of
the tribunal in case the dispute is referred to arbitration.  The commit-
tee’s opinion will constitute a mutual ground for both parties in argu-
ing before the tribunal as they will argue only over the legitimacy and
purpose of the measure only.  However, the question remains whether
the committee’s opinion amounts to a jurisdictional award?  In an-
swering this question, a distinction should be drawn between the
scope of the committee’s mission and the jurisdictional issues.
The committee’s opinion is just an advisory opinion. There is no
binding nature of this opinion to the arbitral tribunal.  It just sets up a
common ground between the parties before resorting to a process that
will result in a binding decision.  Furthermore, the committee’s opin-
ion may induce the parties to settle the case instead of resorting to
arbitration based on the preliminary opinion of the committee about
the dispute. This would result in economy of costs and time.  In the
meantime, the committee’s opinion may lead the parties to eliminate
the scope of the tribunal’s mandate to the disputed issues in the dis-
pute that couldn’t be settled by the committee.
A final theme is the important role of this committee.  A fundamen-
tal insight is the common ground of mutual understanding of the un-
disputed issues between the parties, leaving the disputed ones to the
tribunal.  It may lead the parties to a settlement agreement without
the need to resort to arbitration at all.
CONCLUSION
Investment arbitration has been proved from the early beginning to
be distinctive from commercial arbitration due to the public interest at
stake.  Furthermore, when the environment is introduced as a public
interest, the challenge becomes more difficult.  Investment-environ-
ment disputes have their own complexity whether substantively or
procedurally which harden the arbitrators’ mission in resolving these
disputes.  This paper presents the challenges that confront these dis-
putes and lays down some proposals that may help in finessing the
tension between these conflicting interests.  By offering these propos-
als, I hope to clarify the discussion of this issue, which until this time
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had often been suffused with ambiguity.  Hopefully, the foregoing
proposals will further and encourage more informed approaches going
forward in these disputes.
